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NOTES
Stock Options and the Tax Reform Act of 1969:
The Question of Continued Utility*
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, stock options were very
useful devices for transferring economic benefits from corporate cof-
fers to executive pockets without overly burdensome treatment by
the Internal Revenue Service. In 1969, however, Congress enacted
five new Internal Revenue Code sections and modified a sixth' in an
effort to dampen the affluent American's enthusiasm for tax loop-
holes. Since the Act's passage, there has been much discussion
about the effects of the new provisions on stock option arrange-
ments, with commentators divided on the question whether stock
options remain worthwhile as compensation devices. 2
This Note attempts its own exploration of the compensatory
utility of stock options, beginning with brief sketches of the early
tax law relating to options; the developing legislative, regulatory,
and judicial refinements; and, the state of the law immediately
prior to the Tax Reform Act. The basic operating provisions of the
new Act and the proposed regulations are then examined as they
relate to both statutory and nonstatutory stock options. After out-
lining the goals that employers and employees seek by using stock
options, the Note's conclusion attempts to analyze the degree to
which those goals may still be attained in light of the tax conse-
quences of option arrangements under the 1969 Act.
I. STOCK OPTIONS PRIOR TO THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969
A. Early Treatment
The initially enacted federal tax statutes did not deal specifi-
* This Note was awarded the Edmund Morgan Prize, given for the best student writing
submitted to the Vanderbilt Law Review during the 1972-73 academic year.
1. The new Code sections are: (1) §§ 56-58 (imposing a minimum tax of 10% on speci-
fied items of tax preference, including the difference between fair market value and option
price for qualified options, and the deductible one-half of long term capital gains); (2) § 83
(setting out new rules to govern the transfer of propery in connection with employment); and,
(3) § 1348 (limiting the maximum tax rate on "earned income" to 50%). All were added by:
Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. The amended section is § 1201
(elimination of the 25% alternative capital gains rate in favor of taxation at one-half the
ordinary income rate beyond the first $50,000 of capital gains). Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-172, § 511(b), 83 Stat. 635.
2. See, e.g., Bachelder, Executive Compensation After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 48
TAXES 652 (1970); Childs, Compensating the Executive After the Tax Reform Act with Stock
Options, Restricted Stock, Deferred Pay-and Even Cash, 48 TAXES 801 (1970); Rendell,
Qualified Stock Options: Post-1969 Use Hinges Upon Careful Planning, 32 J. TAX 356 (1970).
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cally with the tax consequences of corporate use of stock options as
devices to secure optimum executive performance. This lack of spe-
cific statutory guidance, however, did not deter the Commissioner
from claiming, under the broad language of section 22(a),3 that all
transfers of stock from an employer to an employee for substantially
less than the stock's fair market value at the date of transfer consti-
tuted taxable "compensation for personal services" in the amount
equal to the difference between option price and current value.'
Since options confer an economic benefit and clearly are not gifts
from disinterested sources, logic seems to have favored the Commis-
sioner's stance, at least to the extent that compensation seems to
have occurred at some point; courts, however, did not respond favor-
ably. Under the view that stock options that were intended by the
employer simply to instill in the employee a sense of ownership and
proprietary concern for corporate welfare did not constitute the sort
of compensation contemplated by the statute, the circuit courts
and, eventually the Board of Tax Appeals, came to apply a
"compensatory-proprietary" test.5 Under this test courts would ex-
amine the total factual situation in each case, including such indicia
as the contractual language' and the size of the exercise
"spread"' 7-the difference between the option price and the fair
market value of the stock-to determine the intention of the parties.
If the parties were found to have intended only the granting of a
proprietary interest, the employee was not taxed upon receipt or
exercise of the option and the corporation was not allowed a deduc-
tion for the option's cost 8 to it When, on the other hand, a
compensatory intent was found, the spread at exercise was taxed as
ordinary income to the employee and the corporation was allowed
a corresponding "ordinary and necessary" expense deduction in the
year of exercise. In either event, gain realized upon the employee's
ultimate disposition of the optioned stock was treated as capital
gain.10
3. "'Gross income' includes.. compensation for personal service of whatever kind
and in whatever form paid . . . ." Act of Feb. 10, 1939, ch. 1, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 9.
4. See Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 22(a)-i (1936); Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 51 (1932); Treas. Reg.
74, Art. 51 (1928); Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 31 (1926); Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 31 (1924).
5. See Lyon, Employee Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 5-10 (1951).
6. See, e.g., Clarence L. Landen, 1 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 411 (1943).
7. See, e.g., Gordon M. Evans, 38 B.T.A. 1406 (1938); Wm. B. Gillies, 8 P-H B.T.A.
MEM. 39-286 (1939).
8. See text accompanying notes 167-69 infra.




In Commissioner v. Smith," however, in an otherwise unre-
markable opinion holding that an option granted by the employer
corporation to purchase stock in a third corporation at approxi-
mately the grant-date fair market value was "compensatory," the
Supreme Court went on to state that "[s]ection 22(a) of the Reve-
nue Act is broad enough to include in taxable income any economic
or financial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation
whatever the form or mode by which it is effected. 1 2 Amidst a storm
of protest from the bar, 3 and despite the Court's apparently qualify-
ing use of the "as compensation" phrase, the Commissioner relied
upon the Smith case as authority for prospective application of the
proposition that the "economic benefit" necessarily obtained by
purchasing stock at an option price below its fair market value-the
spread at exercise-should be taxable in every instance, regardless
of the parties' intent. 4 In 1946, the regulations were amended to
reflect this position,' 5 and critics of the Treasury view appealed to
Congress for relief."
1. Legislative Reaction.-Criticism of the Commissioner's all
inclusive post-Smith approach led ultimately to the inclusion of
provisions in the Revenue Act of 195017 explicitly preserving favora-
ble tax treatment for certain stock options. Although the legislative
history of the Act does not reveal a precise statement of the policy
bases underlying the congressional action, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee's Report on the Bill disapprovingly referred to the impedi-
ment to use of stock options for "incentive purposes" raised by the
Commissioner's approach, and cited the "uncertainty as to whether
the regulations [were] in accordance with the law" as an additional
reason for the Bill's passage. 8 Regardless of the exact rationale be-
hind its enactment, the Act's addition of new section 130A to the
1939 Code manifested a congressional intent to provide a safe harbor
from the rigors of ordinary income treatment for arrangements
meeting the requirements of the newly created classifications of
11. 324 U.S. 177, rehearing denied with supplementary opinion, 324 U.S. 695 (1945).
12. 324 U.S. at 181.
13. Lyon, supra note 5, at 11.
14. Id.
15. T.D. 5507, 1946-1 CUM. BuLL. 18.
16. The United States Chamber of Commerce and the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, inter alia, presented proposals for legislative action to restore the possibility of
favorable tax treatment. See Hearings on Revenue Revisions Before Comm. on Ways and
Afeans, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1492 (1947-48).
17. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 994, § 218, 64 Stat. 942.




Under the new provision, an employee not already a substantial
shareholder who received a nonassignable option with an option
price at least 85 percent of the fair market value of the underlying
stock at date of grant was able to escape all taxation upon grant and
exercise of the option, provided he neither disposed of the stock
within two years of grant or six months of exercise nor failed to
satisfy the requirements of employee status within three months
prior to exercise. 9 As a corollary to this "noncompensation" treat-
ment, the employer was allowed no business expense deduction."
When the employee subsequently disposed of the stock thus ac-
quired, he was entitled to capital gain treatment on all post-grant
appreciation in the stock's value, although any bargain element in
excess of five percent of fair market value at time of grant was taxed
as ordinary income in the year of disposition. 2 The statutory hold-
ing period and spread-limitation conditions imposed by the new
statute were obviously designed to ensure that the employee's tax-
favored status would be, in at least some measure, tied to his con-
tinuing economic stake in the successful operation of the corporate
enterprise. These facets of the statute, therefore, could be viewed as
an implied legislative disapproval of the Commissioner's attempts
to disregard the intent of the parties and classify all spreads at
exercise as compensation income.
2. The Continued Common Law.-Although new section
130A purportedly was designed to relieve uncertainty about the va-
lidity of invariably classifying the spread between option price and
fair market value at exercise as compensation income, the statute
did not have that effect. Because the tax-consequence provisions of
the statute reached only stock options that were properly "re-
stricted," the tax treatment of all other option arrangements was
necessarily still dependent upon the confusing prior case law, which
had prompted the new legislation in the first place.
In 1956, the Supreme Court laid to rest at least some of the
doubt surrounding nonstatutory option tax treatment by holding, in
Commissioner v. LoBue,22 that an assertedly "proprietary" stock
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 130A. For a full description of the requirements for
restricted stock option status imposed by § 130A see Lyon, supra note 5.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 130A, 64 Stat. 942.
21. Id. § 130A(b). Capital gain treatment on disposition resulted, not from any express
provision in § 130A, but from the fact that the stock was a capital asset in the employee's
hands.
22. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
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option nonetheless resulted in ordinary income treatment for the
spread at exercise. The Court stated that "there is not a word in
[section] 22(a) which indicates that its broad coverage should be
narrowed because of an employer's intention to enlist more efficient
service from his employees by making them part proprietors of his
business."" This judicial endorsement of the Commissioner's anti-
pathy to the proprietary-compensatory doctrine, however, fell short
of wholesale approval of the Commissioner's total approach. The
Court expressly reserved the possibility that a transferable option
with a readily ascertainable fair market value might properly be
taxed at the time of grant, rather than the time of exercise,24 thus
shielding from ordinary income treatment any post-grant apprecia-
tion in stock value.
Despite the normal IRS preference for early taxation, the Com-
missioner's desire to focus upon the time of exercise as the trigger
for ordinary income treatment is easy to appreciate-if one assumes
a substantially rising market, the resulting revenues are likely to be
substantially greater than would be the case if the possibly minimal
spread at grant were the governing criterion, even allowing for a
"present value" discount. It is not, however, so easy to justify the
Commissioner's approach using the concepts that underlie our taxa-
tion system as a whole. It seems clear that the elements of compen-
sation inherent in stock-option schemes-the "bargain" resulting
from a chance to purchase the stock at less than its current market
value, and the opportunity to participate in any subsequent appre-
ciation without exposure to investment risks-are in fact obtained
by the employee at the date of grant. Common sense would seem
to indicate, in the case of the latter element, that it is the opportu-
nity to exercise, rather than the exercise itself, that constitutes
compensation. In unremittingly advancing a theory of exercise as
compensation, the Treasury approach seems to have been more op-
portunistic than principled-a situation that should not be consid-
ered altogether healthy, even in a society more or less committed
to an adversary system of taxation. Justification for deferring taxa-
tion until exercise is perhaps best provided under the familiar ra-
tionale that when the value of an economic benefit conferred cannot
be determined until a later time, the transaction will be considered
23. Id. at 247.
24. "It is of course possible for the recipient of a stock option to realize an immediate
taxable gain. The option might have a readily ascertainable market value and the recipient
might be free to sell his option." Id. at 249 (citation omitted).
1973] 1265
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"open" until that time at which the gain can be measured and the
tax imposed. 2 This seems to be the position the Treasury finally has
adopted, as reflected by the regulations promulgated pursuant to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.26
B. The 1954 Code
1. Evolution of the Qualified Stock Option.-The Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 in large measure re-enacted the 1939 Code's
restricted option provisions in the new section 421, with some
changes designed to clarify previous requirements and to enhance
the usefulness of the restricted stock option as a management incen-
tive device. 27 Despite the presumably greater certainty and utility
occasioned by these and subsequent changes, 28 the restricted option
provisions came under increasing fire from commentators, chiefly
because they accorded strikingly favorable tax treatment to highly
compensated executives, often at the cost of severe dilution of share-
holder equity, and because of doubts that these options were even
in theory satisfactorily efficient incentive devices.29 The rising tide
of criticism reached its flood in the Kennedy administration's rec-
ommendation to Congress that the restricted stock option provisions
be repealed in their entirety, on the ground that stock options were
compensatory in nature and therefore should not be treated differ-
ently than wages or salaries." The House Ways and Means Commit-
25. See, e.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). Normally, however, the receipt of
"property" is a taxable event, even though its valuation might not be exact. See Rev. Rul.
58-402, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 15.
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c), T.D. 6540, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 161, 162-63.
27. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421 (as originally enacted). See MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION, Code Commentary §§ 421-25:3 (J. Malone ed. 1971). Specific changes
included broadening the scope of the section to cover variable price options (§ 421(d) (1) (A)
(ii)), clarifying the rules governing exercise of the option after the death of the employee
(§ 421(d) (6)), and providing for corporate rearrangements (§ 421(g)). See id.
28. Subsequent changes included the provision for a stepped-up basis in the event of
exercise following the employee's death (§ 421(d) (1958)); the definition of "employer corpo-
ration" to encompass a parent or subsidiary of the grantor (§ 421(a)); and, restrictions upon
the scope available for fixing the price under a variable price option (§ 421(d) (7)). See
MERTENS, supra note 27, at §§ 421-25:3.
29. Griswold, The Mysterious Stock Option, 51 Ky. L. J. 246 (1962) (originally prepared
at the request of the House Ways and Means Committee, 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Revision Compendium 1327 (Comm. Print 1959)). See also
Wallace, Should We Continue to Encourage the Use of Restricted Stock Options?, 39 TAXES
785 (1961).
30. See President Kennedy's 1963 Tax Message as cited in 1 HEARINGS BEFORE THE




tee, however, elected to retain favorable tax treatment for statutory
stock options, although it recognized that "abuses" had made the
previous statutory scheme unsatisfactory.3' The Committee rea-
soned that increased profitability in individual businesses was good
for the economy as a whole and that, since management's having a
stake in the successful operation of business "provides important
incentives to expand and improve the profit positions of the compa-
nies involved, ' 32 the stock option provisions should be continued.
The Committee's curative recommendations, which were sub-
sequently enacted into sections 421-25 of the Code, 33 involved the
creation of two new statutory categories of stock options,34 and the
prospective elimination of the old "restricted" category.35 The direct
successor to the restricted option, the "qualified"3 option, was the
product of major corrective surgery on the restricted option scheme.
To ensure that recipients of these new options would in fact be
acquiring a "stake in the business," favorable tax treatment was
conditioned upon the underlying stock's having been held by the
employee for a minimum period of three years.37 To lessen the prob-
ability that gain under the option agreement would follow automati-
cally from participation in the plan, rather than depend upon the
individual proprietary efforts of employees, the maximum period for
which an option could remain outstanding was reduced to five
years, 3 no bargain element was allowed at the time of grant,39 and
the corporation's ability to grant new qualified options at lower
prices under declining market conditions was eliminated." Further,
31. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64 (1963).
32. Id. at 64.
33. Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 63-73.
34. The two categories of newly created options were the "qualified stock option,"
defined in § 422, and the "employee stock purchase plan," defined in § 423. The employee
stock purchase plan was designed to encourage nondiscriminatory methods of raising capital
by allowing discount purchases of stock by employees when the statutory conditions are met.
H. R. REP. No. 749, supra note 31, at 69-71. Since this Note deals with the problems of
executive compensation via stock options, and since the nondiscrimination requirements of
§ 423 make it an impractical executive incentive tool, the section will not be discussed
further.
35. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 424(b), defines restricted stock option to include only
such options granted prior to January 1, 1964. Section 424(c) (3), however, provides a special
"extension" for options granted pursuant to pre-1964 binding written contracts and certain
pre-existing nondiscriminatory arrangements.
36. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422.
37. H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 31, at 67; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(a) (1).
:38. H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 31, at 67; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (3).
39. H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 31, at 68; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (4).
40. H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 31, at 68; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b).
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a continuous employment requirement was added;" shareholder
approval was required for qualified option plans,42 presumably be-
cause shareholders directly bear the cost in terms of equity dilution;
and a provision was inserted to preserve substantially all of the
section's benefits for employees of close corporations that miscalcu-
late market value, which by definition is undeterminable, in good
faith attempts to set option prices.1
3
Upon satisfaction of the qualified option conditions, the same
tax treatment formerly afforded restricted options followed-no tax
upon grant" or exercise45 of the option, and capital gain treatment
upon disposition of the underlying stock. 6 As under previous law,
no deduction was allowed the employer corporation. 7 In the event
of a disqualifying disposition, for example one that occured less than
three years from exercise of the option, the amount of the spread at
exercise was treated as ordinary income to the employee in the year
of disposition, with a corresponding deduction to the employer. 8
Although the statutory requirements were clearly much more
restrictive than under former law, the statutory stock option re-
mained a highly attractive device for highly compensated employ-
ees. Given the disparity between the alternative capital gains rate
of 25 percent and the maximum marginal rate on ordinary income
of 70 percent, and the normal attractiveness of tax deferral, the
more exacting requirements of section 422 apparently were well
worth the trouble. 9
41. H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 31, at 67; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(a) (2).
42. H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 31, at 67; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (1).
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(c) (1).
44. The Code provisions do not refer to the possibility of taxation upon grant; presuma-
bly, the drafters assumed that existing law made such reference unnecessary. See BNA TAX
MGT. PORTFOLIO 183-2d, Stock Options (Statutory)-Taxation, at A-16.
45. § 421(a) (1) specifically provides that "no income shall result" (with the exception
of the good faith provision, see note 43 supra and accompanying text) from the exercise of an
option that meets the requirements of section 422(a).
46. Although, the stock option sections do not expressly provide for capital gain treat-
ment, such treatment necessarily attends disposition because the stock is a capital asset in
the employee's hands.
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421(a) (2).
48. Id. § 421(b).
49. FORTUNE, July 1970, at 100, indicates that qualified stock options were offered (pre-
1969 tax reform act) by more than 75% of "Fortune's 500." For more complete analyses of
the provisions of the 1964 amendments see Baker, Employee Stock Option Plans Under The
Revenue Act of 1964, 20 TAX L. REv. 77, 78 (1964); Frei, Stock Options in the Light of the
1964 Revenue Act, 42 TAXES 872 (1964); Wilf, One Year of the New Stock Option Rules (or
'Trying to Make a Silk Purse Out of a Sow's Ear'), N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 755 (1966).




2. Nonstatutory Options Under the Treasury
Regulations. -The congressional efforts to shape satisfactory legis-
lative treatment for classes of tax-favored options perhaps oversha-
dowed, but certainly did not hinder, developments in the area of
nonstatutory options. Faced with judicial decisions that apparently
attempted to resolve the continuing uncertainty about the proper
time for option taxation by offering an avenue of unfettered access
to tax avoidance through the use of restrictions affecting fair market
value,5" the Treasury proposed comprehensive regulations that cen-
tered upon exercise of the option as the taxable event.51 After an
extensive period of review, the final version of the regulation was
approved in 1961.52 The final Treasury position, perhaps on the
strength of the Supreme Court's "readily ascertainable" dictum in
Commissioner v. LoBue,53 recognized that the grant of an option
having "readily ascertainable" fair market value was the proper
occasion for taxation, but defined the quoted term so restrictively
that any option not actively traded on an established market had
little chance of being found to have "readily ascertainable" value.54
In the unlikely event that a nonstatutory option should be found
susceptible to valuation under these rules, the Treasury Regulation
provided that the employee would realize compensation-and the
employer would be allowed a deduction-in the year of grant, in an
amount equal to the difference between the fair market value of the
.50. In Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952), the Tax Court held that, because
restrictions on use and sale of stock received pursuant to the exercise of an option prevented
its having any ascertainable market value, no tax would be incurred upon its transfer to the
opt ionee. The same court, in Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951), held no income was realized
when similar restrictions had lapsed on the ground that the value of the stock on the date of
restriction lapse "might be out of all proportion to the compensation involved in the original
acquisition of the shares." Id. at 654. In McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.
1954), rev'g 19 T.C. 1001 (1953), and Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir.
1954), afl'g 19 T.C. 872 (1953), the courts found that receipt of a stock option having ascer-
tainable value was a taxable event.
51. 21 Fed. Reg. 8774 (1956).
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6540, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 161.
53. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
54. Spiegel, Development and Current Status of Nonstatutory Stock Options, 19 U. So.
CAL. TAX INST. 217, 227 (1967). If an option is not actively traded on an established market,
to have "readily ascertainable" value it must be (1) freely transferable, (2) immediately
exercisable in full, and (3) free of any restriction having a significant effect on fair market
value (the option stock must be similarly free). In addition, the value of the "option" privilege
(i.e. the opportunity to profit from future appreciation in the option stock without undertak-
ing the risk of investment) must be readily ascertainable after considering factors specified




option and its cost to the employee,5 with no compensation income
resulting from exercise of the option. 6
When, as usually will be the case, the option itself has no read-
ily ascertainable fair market value, the new regulations provided
that compensation income would be realized in an amount equal to
the spread between the option price and the stock's fair market
value-and a deduction available to the employer 5-at the time the
employee acquires an unconditional right to receive the stock, pro-
vided the stock was not subject to a restriction having a sighificant
effect on its value. In the event that the optioned stock was subject
to such a restriction at the time of exercise, the Treasury took the
position that compensation income would not result until the re-
striction lapsed or the stock was sold or exchanged, whichever oc-
curred first. 9 The. amount of compensation was set at the lesser of
the spread at exercise-determined as though the restriction had
not existed-or the difference between the option price and the
stock's value at the time of taxation.60 Under all of these regulatory
alternatives, the employee's basis for the optioned stock was in-
creased by any amount included in gross income as a consequence
of the regulations' operation."
Although the element of ordinary income and the unavailabil-
ity of complete tax deferral until disposition of the stock " made the
tax consequences of nonstatutory options less attractive than those
of qualified options, the former category of options was not necessar-
ily inferior as an executive incentive device. The inapplicability of
the statutory restrictions imposed upon qualified options afforded
nonstatutory options a valuable advantage in flexibility. The ab-
sence of a five-year grant-to-exercise limit, for example, allowed the
participant in a nonqualified arrangement to benefit from an unlim-
ited time period in which to retain the opportunity to profit from
55. Id. § 1.421-6(c)(1) (employee's deduction), § 1.421-6(f) (employer's deduction).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(a)(3) (1959), as amended, T.D. 6540, 1961-1 Curd. Bun.. 880.
57. Id. § 1.421-6(f).
58. Id. § 1.421-6(d)(1).
59. Id. § 1.421-6(d)(2)(1).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 1.421-6(e).
62. Although the attachment of restrictions that significantly affect the market value
of the underlying stock may result in income tax deferral for a holder of nonstatutory optioned
stock, the deferral is not so complete as that available under the statutory option provisions,
because the nonstatutory option regulations provide that the employee's death will trigger
compensation treatment. Id. § 1.421-6(d)(5). The statute, on the other hand, provides for a




appreciation in the underlying stock's value while incurring no
down-side risk, and the lack of a holding-period requirement per-
mitted the employee to finance his stock purchases by concurrent
resale of a portion of the stock so acquired.13 Moreover, by judicious
use of such "significant restrictions on value" as book-value buy-out
agreements,64 taxation on the spread at exercise could be deferred
indefinitely and any post-exercise appreciation of the stock's value
could be enjoyed at capital gains rates.
IX. THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969
A. Legislative History
1. Evolution of Specific Legislation. -The Tax Reform Act of
196965 was the product of a climate of dissatisfaction with an exist-
ing tax structure that enabled many persons with huge economic
incomes and carefully designed tax shelters to pay little or no tax,
leaving the less affluent to shoulder the revenue burden.6 The exact
role that statutory stock options were thought to have played in the
creation and maintenance of these undesirable conditions is not
clear. In any event, the movement for reform took a focus broad
enough to bypass any detailed examination of the effectiveness of
sections 421-25 in the context of national tax policy. Its own analysis
of the current state of affairs led the Treasury Department to recom-
mend to Congress that relatively drastic reform measures be under-
taken, including minimum67 and maximum68 taxes designed to oper-
ate upon an expanded tax base that would include economic income
from sources that were sheltered from taxation under pre-1969 law.
The minimum tax was designed to apply a graduated rate to "total
income"-a concept that entailed taking into account what the
Treasury viewed as the otherwise "unacceptable tax abuses or ad-
vantages" stemming from capital gains, interest received on state
and local government bonds, percentage depletion in excess of capi-
tal invested, and deductions offsetting appreciation on charitable
gifts. 9 For purposes of the maximum tax, which was to ensure that
63. See Henry, Financing Executive Purchases Under Stock Option Plans, N.Y.U. 24TH
INST. ON FED. TAX. 789 (1966).
64. See Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(2)(ii) (example (3)), as amended, T.D. 6540, 1961-1
CvM. BULL. 880.
65. Act of December 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
66. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969).
67. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS (Part 1) 13-15 (Comm. Print 1969).
68. Id at 17-18.
69. Id. at 14.
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no person paid an effective rate on his total income greater than 50
percent,7" the Department recommended that total income include,
in addition to the preference items included in the minimum tax
proposal, the spread between option price and fair market value on
"any stock options" 71 exercised during the year, under the rationale
that
stock options represent a major component of executive compensation
which-although eventually taxable when the stock is sold-should neverthe-
less be included in the year in which exercised to obtain a realistic measure of
the relationship between an individual's total income and his tax payments
and thereby the appropriateness of applying the maximum ceiling.
7 2
This treatment proposed by the Treasury Department would seem
to reflect a view that stock options occupy something of a middle
ground in the war against tax avoidance. They apparently were not
deemed productive of sufficient abuse to merit inclusion in the min-
imum tax scheme; yet their tax-sheltering aspects were thought real
enough to warrant inclusion in the broad base called for by the
maximum tax proposal. Whatever the analytical merit of this brief
Treasury statement may be, it is apparently the closest that the
legislative history of the Tax Reform Act comes to an express con-
sideration of the specific policy bases underlying the Act's treat-
ment of statutory stock options.
The Department's broad recommendations were not enacted.
The House transformed 3 the minimum tax proposal into a complex
provision designed to limit those tax preferences previously con-
demned by the Treasury proposal.74 This Bill did not refer to statu-
tory stock options. The Senate, however, rejected the House's ap-
proach in favor of a simpler design that entailed a relatively
straightforward tax on the tax preference items listed in the House
Bill, with an unexplained addition of several items, including the
"bargain element" in qualified (and restricted) stock options. 5 The
Senate amendments provided the basic structure for the minimum
70. Id. at 18.
71. Id. Presumably, the Treasury intended to refer only to statutory stock options, since
it is difficult to see why the spread at exercise on nonstatutory options, already included in
ordinary income under existing law, should be again singled out for inclusion in "total in-
come."
72. Id.
73. For an explanation of the Treasury's position on the evolution of its original pro-
posal see Statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy,
Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at
547 (1969).
74. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 77-83 (1969).
75. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1969).
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tax as ultimately enacted."6
The House also rejected the Treasury's broad maximum-tax
proposal, and instead adopted a 50 percent maximum rate on
earned income.17 The stated purpose of this maximum rate on
earned income was not tax relief, but rather was "reduc[ing] pres-
sure for the use of tax loopholes," and lowering the "incentive to
engage in otherwise unprofitable operations" and spend "time and
effort on 'tax planning' at the expense of pursuing normal business
operations." 8 The House version apparently limited its anti-
loophole effect to earned income on the theory that the disincentive
effect of high tax rates was greatest in the case of earnings. 79 Al-
though the Senate opposed the maximum tax measure on the
ground that it offended the principle of progressivity, the Bill was
passed as reported by the Joint Committee with the addition of a
provision that offset a taxpayer's eligibility for the 50 percent maxi-
mum rate by the excess of his tax-preference items over 30,000
dollars. This provision again reflects the theory that reduction of the
incentive to use tax avoidance devices is inappropriate when the
taxpayer already has sheltered a substantial part of his income
through preferred tax treatment.81
2. Policy considerations.-The legislative history of the 1969
Tax Reform Act, only a small portion of which has just been dis-
cussed,8" offers scant comfort to one who looks for guidelines to aid
interpretation of the Act's provisions as they affect the tax conse-
quences of using stock options as employee-incentive devices. The
legislative history does serve to emphasize a basic thrust of the
Act-reduction of opportunities for escape from the general rate
structure-but the absence of specific delineation of policy goals
that relate to the Act's effect upon transactions governed by sections
421-25 and the regulations thereunder prevent the sort of conclu-
sions about congressional intent that would be most helpful in as-
76. See H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 301-02 (1969).
77. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (1969).
78. Id.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1969) (Joint Committee general
explanation of the Act).
80. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1969). The deletion received strong
support from Senator Gore (D. Tenn.). See id. at 333.
81. See H.R. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 224 (1969) (Joint Committee gen-
eral explanation of the Act).
82. Considerations of space necessitate the omission of the legislative background of the
remaining Tax Reform Act provisions that bear upon stock option arrangements (the reduc-
tion of the tax advantages of capital gains and the new rules for restricted property). The
broad range of other Reform Act topics has been disregarded for lack of direct relevance.
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sessing the sometimes woefully vague language used in the operative
provisions of the new law.
B. Specific Provisions of the Tax Reform Act
Although, as previously pointed out, the Tax Reform Act did
not modify directly the existing Code provisions that govern tax
treatment of stock option arrangements, it indirectly affects the tax
consequences of these arrangements in a number of ways. The
introduction of a minimum tax on tax preference items, 3 the setting
of a maximum marginal rate for earned income,84 the increase of the
tax rate upon long term capital gains, 5 and the new rules governing
restricted property"5 all have at least potentially significant effect on
the continued utility of stock options as executive incentive devices.
1. Sections 56-58: The Minimum Tax for Tax Prefer-
ence. -The minimum tax sections provide generally for a tax of ten
percent on the total annual amount of a taxpayer's "items of tax
preference" ' in excess of: (1) the sum of 30,000 dollars, (2) the
taxpayer's otherwise applicable tax liability for the current year,88
and (3) any unused portion of the latter item for the previous seven
years.89 The two items of tax preference that directly affect stock
option arrangements are the amounts represented by the spread at
exercise of qualified stock options" and one-half of the amount by
which the taxpayer's net long-term capital gain exceeds his short-
term capital loss." Thus an employee who holds a qualified stock
83. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 56-58.
84. Id. § 1348.
85. Id. § 1201(b), (c).
86. Id. § 83.
87. Id. § 57(a). The complete listing of tax preference items is comprised of: (1) excess
investment interest (this item was designed to remain a tax preference item through 1971
only, via the "phasing in" of § 163(d), see Olsen, BNA TAX MGT. PORTFoLIo 269, Minimum
Tax- Items of Tax Preference, at A-4); (2) accelerated depreciation (in excess of straight-line)
on real property; (3) accelerated depreciation (in excess of straight-line) on § 1245 property
subject to a net lease; (4) "excess" deductions attributable to amortization of certified pollu-
tion control facilities; (5) "excess" deductions attributable to amortization of railroad rolling
stock; (6) the exercise spread on qualified and restricted stock options; (7) "excess" reserves
for losses on bad debts of certain financial institutions; (8) "excess" depletion deductions;
and (9) an amount equal to one-half the excess of an individual's net long term capital gain
over his short term capital loss and a formula percentage of the excess of net corporate long-
term capital gain over short-term capital loss. Id.
88. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 56(a). Section 56(a) also provides that the computation
should be made without regard to the taxes imposed by §§ 531 and 541, and that the tax so
computed will be reduced by the sum of the credits allowable under §§ 33,37, and 38.
89. Id. § 56(a)(2)(B), § 56(c).
90. The spread at exercise on a restricted stock option is also included. Id. § 57(a)(6).
91. Id. § 57(a)(9).
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option is faced with the possibility not only of paying a tax equal to
ten percent of the "paper profit" he receives from exercising an
option to acquire stock that he may not dispose of for three years,9 2
but also with the prospect of an additional ten percent tax on one-
half of the capital gain he realizes upon ultimate disposition of the
stock. To add insult to injury, the proposed regulations provide that
the employee's stock basis will not be increased to reflect the initial
preference tax paid.13 In effect, these sections result in the imposi-
tion of three taxes-the "stock-option" preference tax, the normal
capital gain tax as it applies to the "spread" element of his ultimate
gain, and the "capital gain" preference tax-upon the employee's
gain from the spread at exercise. Moreover, under the terms of the
statutes involved,94 the unfortunate taxpayer would appear vulnera-
ble to tax-preference treatment for an exercise spread that subse-
quently is accorded compensation income treatment as the result of
a disqualifying disposition. The proposed regulations, however,
temper this possibility by setting out a "tax benefit" rule, which
nullifies the operation of section 57(a)(6) if the disqualifying dispo-
sition occurs in the year of exercise. This minimal largess by the
Treasury, however, may be attacked on at least two perhaps funda-
mentally inconsistent grounds. First, the terms of the statute af-
forded no explicit basis upon which to rest the authority necessary
to effect such a dispensation-under sections 421-22, a "qualified
92. The employee must hold his stock for 3 years in order to meet the qualified-stock-
option requirements of § 422(a)(1). In this situation, he is unable, without incurring the
penalties of a disqualifying disposition, to raise the money to pay the 10% tax by selling a
portion of the stock received pursuant to the option.
93. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(f)(7), 35 Fed. Reg. 19765 (1970).
94. The holding-period and employment requirements of § 422(a) are conditions upon
the applicability of the favorable tax treatment offered by § 421; they are not, however, listed
by § 422 among the conditions that must be met to fall within the definition of "qualified
stock option." Thus, although a disqualifying disposition ends an employee's tax-favored
treatment, it does not affect the "qualified" status of the option when exercised. Since
§ 57(a)(6) merely refers to "a qualified stock option" in defining the spread at exercise as a
tax preference item, the statutory language would appear to call for imposition of the mini-
mum tax regardless of whether the option's favorable treatment under § 421 is later ended
by the operation of § 422 (a)(1) upon a disqualifying disposition.
95. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(f)(5)(i), 35 Fed. Reg. 19764 (1970), provides: "Section
57(a)(6) is inapplicable if, in the taxable year of the transfer, there is a disposition of the stock
or a modification of the stock option plan which disposition or modification renders section
421(a) inapplicable or applicable solely by reason of section 423." Thus, the proposed regula-
tion is also intended to provide for modifications, which under the terms of § 425(h) are
equivalent to the granting of new (and possibly unqualified) options. A failure by the em-
ployee to satisfy the employment requirements of § 422(a) results, under the proposed regula-
tions, in application of its "tax benefit rule" without qualification. Proposed Treas. Reg. §
1.57-I(f)(5)(i), 35 Fed. Reg. 19764 (1970).
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stock option" remains qualified regardless of any subsequent dis-
qualifying disposition, and section 56(a)(6) applies, without hint of
exception, to qualified stock options. Secondly, even if the letter of
the law is properly to be disregarded in pursuit of the section's
underlying policy by penalizing only those transactions which ac-
tually result in the sort of preferred tax treatment that the statuto-
rily described preference items would ordinarily entail, there ap-
pears to be little justification for truncating this policy at the end
of one year. 6
2. Section 1348: The Fifty-Percent Maximum Rate on Earned
Income.-(a) The Basic Statutory Scheme.-Section 1348 provides
for a maximum marginal rate of 50 percent on "earned taxable
income."97 Earned taxable income is that amount of income
"earned" within the meaning of sections 401(c)(2)(C) or 911(b)
which bears the same ratio to taxable income as such earned income
less deductions properly allocated to it under section 162 ("earned
net income")98 bears to adjusted gross income-but less the amount
by which the larger of the taxpayer's current tax preference items,9
or the average of his tax preference items over the past five years,
exceeds 30,000 dollars. Section 1348(b) excludes certain classes of
income, one of which is "deferred compensation within the meaning
of section 404," from its definition of earned income. For at least
three reasons the maximum rate limitation does not reduce loophole
pressure to the extent that a casual glance at the section's title
might indicate. First, the statutory scheme for applying the 50 per-
cent maximum rate ensures that the marginal rates applicable to a
taxpayer's unearned ordinary income will not be lowered because of
the maximum tax.'"" Secondly, the method of reaching taxable
96. Two possible, though certainly not compelling, justifications exist for the Treasury's
one-year limit on the tax benefit principle's operation. The first is that the taxpayer has
indeed secured a tax benefit, in the form of a tax deferral, when he waits until after the year
of exercise to make a disqualifying disposition, although this benefit is not nearly so substan-
tial as the "deferral plus transposition to capital-gains rate" benefit apparently aimed at by
Congress. Second, allowing retroactive inapplicability of the minimum tax would add an
additional note of complexity to the statute.
97. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348(a).
98. "Earned net income" is defined in the statute as follows: "the term 'earned net
income' means the excess of earned income (as defined in § 1.1348-3(a)) over any deductions
which are required to be taken into account under section 62 in determining adjusted gross
income and are properly allocable to or chargeable against earned income." Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.1348-2(d)(2), 36 Fed Reg. 23815 (1971).
99. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 57(b); notes 87-91 supra and accompanying text.
100. Section 1348(a) provides that earned taxable income will be taxed under the ordi-
nary rate structure until the 50% bracket is reached, and that the tax on this amount, plus
1276 [Vol. 26
STOCK OPTIONS
earned income requires allocation of a portion of the taxpayer's
personal and other deductions to earned income.'"' Finally, a large
tax-preference item from a preceding year may return to haunt the
taxpayer under the "average" tax preference offset.
(b) Section 1348 and Qualified Stock Options.-The 50 per-
cent maximum rate on earned income has two significant conse-
quences in the qualified stock option area. First, if the taxpayer has
tax-preference items in excess of 30,000 dollars, each dollar of
qualified-option spread at exercise, because it is a tax preference
item under section 57(a)(6), will remove a dollar of earned income
from the relatively comforting 50 percent bracket and place it in the
less desirable environs of the tax rates applicable to other ordinary
income. Assuming the worst, the tax rate will be increased from 50
to 70 percent' 2 on an amount of the taxpayer's other income equal
to his paper profit on exercise of a qualified option-a situation
equivalent to a direct tax of twenty percent on the qualified option
spread.'"3 In addition, this situation causes the taxpayer to worry
that the size of his qualified option tax preference will, through the
averaging provisions, affect his eligibility for the maximum earned
income rate over the next four years, but also, assuming his current
high income and tax preference situation continues, he must expect
a substantial repetition of the twenty percent increase in his tax
bracket and four-year eligibility effect upon realization of capital
gain when he disposes of the optioned stock." 4 Secondly, section
1348 will concern the employee who has made a disqualifying dispo-
sition of his option stock. Although the gain recognized upon a dis-
qualifying disposition is considered to be compensation'' for the
employee's services, and although section 911(b), through which
section 1348 derives its definition of earned income, defines earned
income to include "compensation for personal services actually ren-
50% of any remaining amount of earned income, will be subtracted from what would other-
wise be the total tax (computed under § 1 as though the earned income provisions did not
exist) to reach the actual tax due.
101. See Johnson, Minimum and Maximum Taxes After Two Years-A Survey and
General Evaluation, 50 TAXES 68, 78 (1972).
102. Under current income tax rates, a married taxpayer filing a joint return would need
a taxable income of over $52,000 in order to benefit from the maximum tax rate, and a taxable
income of over $200,000 to be exposed to the 70% marginal rate on ordinary income.
103. See Asimow, The Maximum Tax on Earned Income: Tax Planning for the
Seventies, 23 U. So. CAL. TAx INST. 19, 96 (1971).
104. The 20% increase in tax bracket, however, would apply only to a dollar amount
equivalent to one-half the gain realized, since only one-half is a tax preference item under
§ 57 (a)(9), making the situation the equivalent of a direct tax of 10% on the gain realized.
105. Cf. Treas. Reg. 1.61-2(d)(4) (1966).
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dered," the statutory exclusion of "deferred compensation" from
earned income ' "6 creates some doubt that the terms of the Code
permit an employee's gain from a disqualifying disposition to qual-
ify for the 50 percent rate on earned income. This doubt exists
because section 404, from which section 1348 draws its definition of
"deferred compensation," refers to plans or methods for deferring
receipt of compensation and existing law looks to the time of exer-
cise '07 in measuring compensation income that is treated as "re-
ceived" in the year of the disqualifying disposition.' 8 The proposed
regulations, however, resolve this problem in favor of earned-income
treatment, and taxpayer challenges do not seem likely.
(c) Section 1348 and Nonstatutory Options. -Concern about
the earned-unearned status of income realized on the exercise of
nonstatutory stock options is likely to raise problems of statutory
interpretation glossed over by the proposed regulations in the case
of disqualifying dispositions. Since unqualified stock option ar-
rangements do not involve tax preference items, the danger attend-
ant to qualified plans of penalizing earned income does not arise.
Thus, the effect of section 1348 upon unqualified options turns on
the deceptively simple question whether the income required to be
recognized upon exercise is "earned." Again, there seems to be little
doubt that the income constitutes "compensation for personal serv-
ices" within the meaning of section 911(b); the problem is whether
it is "deferred compensation" and thus ineligible for the maximum
rate limitation. When a nonqualified option is exercised within the
year following the taxable year of grant, the spread will qualify as
earned income under section 1348(b), which excludes from deferred
compensation "any amount received before the end of the taxable
year following the first taxable year of the recipient in which his
right to receive such amount is not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture (within the meaning of section 83(c) (1))." Under a regula-
tion proposed pursuant to the same provision, the device of attach-
ing a substantial risk of forfeiture to the option stock may operate
to ensure qualification for the maximum rate."0 9
When the risk of forfeiture is not involved, however, exercise of
a nonqualified option in a year subsequent to the year following the
106. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1348(b).
107. Id. § 421(b).
108. Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-8(b) provides that "[t]he income attributable to such
[disqualifying] transfer shall be treated . . . as income received in the taxable year in which
such disposition occurs."
109. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1348-3(b)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 23817 (1971).
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year of grant raises problems that the Code sections do not clearly
resolve. Because of the essentially vague character of the statutory
language,"" and the somewhat elusive nature of the concepts in-
volved, the combinations and permutations of arguments and theo-
ries are practically endless, and the legislative history provides
scant guidance."' For example, it is possible to reason that compen-
sation by means of nonqualified options does not come "within the
meaning" of section 404, which governs the deductibility of compen-
sation under deferred payment plans or methods, because the de-
ductibility of stock option compensation is specifically governed by
the Regulations under a different section, section 421.112 On a more
theoretical level, section 404's reference to plans "deferring the re-
ceipt" of compensation can be used to argue that the spread at
exercise is not deferred compensation because compensation is in
fact "received" under stock-option arrangements at the time of
grant, and only the taxation of it is deferred to a later time.",
On the other hand, it is possible to argue that the term "within
the meaning of section 404" does not mean that the compensation
at issue must be subject to the provisions of section 404, but rather
that such compensation must only be within the general concept of
deferred compensation embodied in that section.' 4 There are sub-
stantial difficulties with this argument, since section 404 purports
to reach all transactions to which its "deferred compensation" lan-
110. For example, the term "deferred compensation" standing alone could hardly be
said to have a precise objective content. By referring the taxpayer to § 404 for the "meaning"
of deferred compensation, § 1348 does little to remedy this lack of precision, since § 404 does
not explain the term, and the body of precedential interpretation thereunder provides mini-
mal additional assistance. See Watts, The Maximum Tax on Earned Income: Section 1348,
26 TAx L. REv. 1, 25 (1970).
111. The Ways and Means Committee Report spoke merely of "deferred compensa-
tion," without further explanation, H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), and the Bill as reported contained the unadorned phrase "deferred compensation
payment." H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 802 (1969). The reference to § 404 was added
by the Conference Committee, for reasons apparently known only to that body. JOINT CONF.
REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 804 (1969). A possible indication of legislative intent
may be the references in the Committee reports concerning the enactment of § 83 of the Code
to stock option arrangements as "deferred compensation arrangements." H.R. REP. No. 91-
413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 86-87 (1969). The context of the discussion must be kept
in mind, however.
112. See Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (1966). See also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(a)(2),
36 Fed. Reg. 10787 (1971). This argument necessarily views the Conference Committee's
insertion of the reference to § 404 as designed to limit the meaning of "deferred compensa-
tion" to deferred payments by an employer, the deductibility of which is governed directly
by § 404.
113. See Watts, supra note 110, at 22-23.
114. See Asimow, supra note 103.
127919731
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
guage refers, but it apparently represents the position that the




In reply to the theory that the exercise of a nonqualified option
represents, at most, delayed taxation, rather than deferred receipt
of compensation, a substantial argument may be offered that the
policy underlying both section 1348 and section 404 requires that
"deferral" be deemed to refer to tax consequences, not metaphysical
concepts or technical legal distinctions. This, too, is apparently the
position taken by the Treasury."6
Although the Treasury positions on the meaning of deferred
compensation within section 1348 would seem logically to suggest
that the exercise of a nonqualified option should result in deferred
compensation" 7 ineligible for the 50 percent maximum rate, the
Proposed Regulations, without explanation, take a different stance.
The proposed rule opts for earned income, and not deferred compen-
sation, but only if the terms of the option in question do not allow
exercise more than three months after termination of employ-
ment."' There appears to be no satisfactory theoretical explanation
for the Treasury's position on this point. If the "all or nothing"
arguments previously suggested are rejected, then the only remain-
ing alternative with substantial support in principle would seem to
be some version of the rationale previously offered in Revenue Rul-
ing 69-118.' In that ruling the measure of deferred compensation
upon option exercise was apparently held to turn upon the year in
which services were performed to which an amount of the compen-
sation received would be properly attributable. This rationale, how-
ever, would require proration of exercise compensation according to
the years to which various portions would be attributable-a conse-
quence that the Treasury would understandably be reluctant to
endorse under section 1348.
115. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1348-3(b)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 23817 (1971).
116. Id.
117. It is conceivable, though not entirely logical, that one could espouse both positions
and still maintain that the spread at exercise on a nonqualified stock option does not repre-
sent deferred compensation, on the theory that, since existing law taxes the spread as though
it were current compensation, it should be so treated for the purposes of § 1348. This appar-
ently was the Treasury's initial line of thought on the subject. See Address by Hon. John S.
Nolan, University of Pennsylvania Tenth Annual Tax Conference, Oct. 14, 1970 (reprinted
in BNA DAILY TAX REP. No. 207 (Oct. 23, 1970)). See also Childs, Compensating the Execu-
tive After the Tax Reform Act with Stock Options, Restricted Stock, Deferred Pay-and Even
Cash, 48 TAXES 801 (1970).
118. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1348-3(b)(3)(iii)(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 23818 (1971). Of course,
any exercise within one year following the year of grant will qualify as earned income. Id.
119. 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 135.
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Whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the problems sur-
rounding the concept of deferred compensation in the context of
stock option arrangements, an employee who wishes to plan under
the guidance of the Proposed Regulations can maximize his chances
of securing earned income treatment by ensuring that the option
agreement negates the possibility of exercise after three months
from termination of employment. In any event, employees holding
nonstatutory options will not suffer affirmatively adverse conse-
quences from the enactment of section 1348.120 At worst, ineligibility
for the maximum rate on earned income will leave them precisely
where they were before 1969-with the difference between option
price and fair market value at exercise taxed at ordinary income
rates.
3. Section 1201: The Increased Alternative Capital Gain
Rate.-Again motivated by the realization that many high-income
taxpayers were structuring their transactions to take advantage of
the pre-1969 25 percent maximum rate on long term capital
gain-often thereby reducing their effective tax rates below those
incurred by less affluent taxpayers and arguably violating the intent
behind the progressive rate structure12 1-Congress, in 1969,
amended section 1201 to provide in essence that such long term gain
in excess of 50,000 dollars would be taxed at one-half the ordinary
rate structure, or a maximum marginal rate of 35 percent.122 The
impact of this amendment on qualified stock option arrangements
lies in its reduction of the incentive for employees to seek an escape
from the tax rates upon compensation income. Before the Tax Re-
form Act, a highly compensated employee suffering under a 70 per-
cent marginal tax rate might have been irresistibly tempted by the
opportunity afforded by a qualified stock option plan, not only to
defer taxation, but also to reduce his tax rate by approximately 64
percent. Under current law, the deferral possibility is still available,
but the tax rate reduction opportunity has been reduced, given the
applicability of section 1348's maximum 50 percent rate on earned
income to the employee's current compensation, to fifteen percen-
tage points (50 percent less 35 percent), a 30 percent reduction from
the earned income rate. 123
120. Indirectly, of course, employees with large tax preference items could suffer from
the displacement of what would otherwise constitute earned income provided in § 1348(b)(2).
See text accompanying notes 102-04 supra.
121. H.R. REp. No. 91-413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969).
122. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 511(b), 83 Stat. 635.
123. This assumes that the employee has sufficient capital gains from other sources to
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4. Section 83: Property Transferred in Connection With Per-
formance of Services.-Section 83, added to the Code in 196914 in
response to Treasury recommendations for statutory recognition of
the problems incident to schemes for using restricted property as
compensation for services, 125 is a broad and fairly complex section
26
that sets out rules to govern transfers of property in connection with
the performance of services. By virtue of a specific exclusion, 2 the
section does not apply to statutory stock options, but nonstatutory
options are exposed to the full impact of its provisions. Section 83
provides generally that, when property is transferred in connection
with the performance of services, the difference between its fair
market value and the amount paid for it will be included in the gross
income of the person who performed the services, in the first taxable
year in which the property becomes either transferable or free from
a substantial risk of forfeiture.1 2 The fair market value is deter-
mined without regard to any restriction other than a restriction that
by its terms will never lapse, and at the earliest time the rights of
the transferee become transferable or free from the risk of forfeiture.
A deduction in an amount equal to that included in the recipient's
income is allowed to the employer in the tax year that encompasses
the end of that year in which the person performing the services was
taxed.121
Alternatively, the section provides that the person who per-
forms the services may elect to include in his income for the year of
transfer the excess of the property's fair market value-determined
without reference to lapsable restrictions-over the amount paid for
it,""° with the employer receiving a concomitant deduction. 3' This
offset the $50,000 that remains eligible for a 25% tax rate under § 1201(b).
124. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 321(a), 83 Stat. 588.
125. See BNA TAx MGT. PORTFOLIO 262, Restricted Property-Section 83, at A-1.
126. Section 83's complexity and scope create problems of interpretation and applica-
tion that are beyond the scope of this Note. Consequently, only some of the questions raised
by its application to stock option compensation will be considered here. For fuller discussions
of the section see Blake, Compensatory Property (Restricted and Unrestricted) Under Section
83 of the Code, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1273 (1971); Koppel, Restricted Stock: What's
Left After the Tax Reform Act of 1969?, 48 TAxEs 558 (1970); sources cited in BNA TAX MGT.
PoRTFouo 262, supra note 125, at C-3.
127. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 83(e)(1). Section 83(e) also excludes transfers in respect
of § 401(a) trusts or § 404(a) (2) annuities, transfers of options without readily ascertainable
market value, and transfers of property pursuant to options that had readily ascertainable
fair market values at grant.
128. Id. § 83(a).
129. Id. § 83(h). The deduction is allowed only to the extent that it qualifies under
§ 162.
130. Id. § 83(b).
131. Id. § 83(h).
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election procedure entails an element of risk when possible forfei-
ture is involved, because a subsequent forfeiture of the property will
not give rise to a deduction for the tax previously paid.'3 2 Finally,
section 83 provides that any increase in the fair market value of
transferred property from the cancellation of a restriction that by
its terms will never lapse will be treated as compensation, to the
extent not offset by any consideration paid for the cancellation, in
the year in which cancellation occurs.'
33
Translated into the language of nonstatutory options, the sec-
tion's provisions mean that when an employee receives, upon exer-
cise of his option, transferable stock that is not subject to a substan-
tial risk of forfeiture, he must include the exercise spread in his
taxable income, no matter how many or how severe the restrictions
that otherwise affect the market value of the stock received. Non-
lapsable restrictions, however, are allowed to be considered in deter-
mining fair market value. Moreover, when a substantial risk of for-
feiture is present and the employee does not elect early taxation,
with the result that taxation is deferred to a later date, any interven-
ing appreciation in the stock's market value will be figured into the
spread for determining compensation income at the time the risk
lapses, rather than receiving the benefit of capital gain rates. Thus,
in sharp contrast to prior law governing the exercise of nonstatutory
options to receive stock subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture,'34
deferral of taxation can be gained only when there is a substantial
risk of losing the stock altogether, and even then at a cost of forego-
ing the benefits of capital gain treatment for any deferral-period
appreciation.
Substantial questions remain about the effect of section 83 on
nonstatutory stock options, even in view of the explanation and
interpretation offered by the proposed Treasury regulations.'3 5 For
example, the term "substantial risk of forfeiture," because it gov-
erns the timing of taxation, is central to the operation of the statute.
Section 83(c)(1) states that "[t]he rights of a person in property
are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if such person's rights
to full enjoyment of such property are conditioned upon the future
performance of substantial services by any individual."' 3 ' Unless the
132. Id. § 83(b).
133. Id. § 83(d)(2).
134. See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
135. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83, 36 Fed Reg. 10788 (1971).
136. Section 83(c) also defines "transferability" as follows: "The rights of a person in
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hoary maxim expressio unius is brought to bear, this statement
would seem to allow the existence of other kinds of substantial
forfeiture risks. Indeed, the legislative history of section 83 discloses
the House Committee's position that the question cioends upon the
facts and circumstances surrounding each restriction involved.'3
The proposed regulations, however, define such a risk only in terms
of forfeiture conditioned upon performing or refraining from per-
forming substantial services, with the element of substantiality be-
coming a question of fact to be decided in each case under general
regulatory guidelines.'38 Under those guidelines, for example, the
traditionally employed noncompetition and consulting-services
agreements will not be considered as involving "substantial" serv-
ices unless specific facts and circumstances indicate to the con-
trary. '39 The question of how great the risk of forfeiture must be to
come within the statutory requirement of substantiality is itself to
a large degree unresolved. The proposed regulations make it clear
that a major shareholder will experience difficulty in convincing the
Commissioner that he may fail to satisfy the required restrictions,
since they make control of the corporation a significant factor in
establishing a lack of a "substantial risk of forfeiture.""' The ques-
tion is one of fact, however, and the development of concrete stan-
dards will have to await future cases and rulings.
The interpretation of a second key phrase, "a restriction which
by its terms will never lapse," raises questions about section 83's
effect, since it is the only kind of restriction whose effect on the fair
market value of the stock will be taken into account in determining
the spread to be taxed under either the general rule or special elec-
tion provision of the section."' Subsection 83(d) and the proposed
regulations indicate that a restriction that limits all future transfers
of the stock to sales under a formula-fixed price is a nonlapsable
restriction, 1 2 and the proposed regulations further indicate that lim-
itations on disposition imposed by securities law or mandatory fair
market value buy-out provisions are not nonlapsable.'4 3 The Treas-
property are transferable only if the rights in such property of any transferee are not subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83(c)(2). Although this is
something of an Alice-in-Wonderland definition, it does not appear to raise any problems in
applying the statute.
137. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part 2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1969).
138. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 10790-91 (1971).
139. Id. at 10791.
140. Id.
141. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83(a)(1).




ury's view on securities law restrictions-and presumably any other
restrictions imposed by law-is likely to be challenged by an em-
ployee who receives a sizeable block of unregistered stock upon exer-
cise of his option, and finds himself facing a substantial tax liability
based upon the unrestricted fair market value of the stock, while the
strictures of Rule 144'11 leave him with the possibility of realizing
only a fraction of that value in the foreseeable future. If, for exam-
ple, one supposes a case in which the only current available avenue
of disposition for the employee's "lettered" stock entails a discount
of over 50 percent, the tax due upon receipt of the stock under the
50 percent maximum rate of section 1348 would exceed the amount
the employee could realize upon it; hence, in real terms, its eco-
nomic value rests in his hands.'45 In such a situation, the employee
would be likely to argue, first, that the securities-law restrictions
upon resale of his stock are restrictions which by their terms will
never lapse, and, secondly, that any contrary interpretation of the
statute would result in a tax on an amount in excess of his income,
in violation of the sixteenth amendment. Even if the employee could
succeed in characterizing Rule 144's perpetual restrictions as "non-
lapsing," the Commissioner might nevertheless prevail on the inter-
pretation point by advancing the argument that the statutory lan-
guage contemplates only restrictions imposed by agreement be-
144. SEC Rule 144, adopted effective April 15, 1972, SEC Release No. 33-5223. Rule
144 itself is not a "restriction," since it in essence merely provides a purportedly nonexclusive
means by which a security holder may dispose of his stock without violating the Securities
Act's basic prohibition against selling unregistered stock. A holder of restricted securities may
dispose of them in an amount up to 1% of the shares outstanding every 6 months under Rule
144 after a 2-year holding period, but only if the requirements of the section are met. Despite
the apparent nonexclusivity of the section, however, there is every indication that efforts to
"free" the shares outside of Rule 144 will prove unavailing, and inducing the company to
register the stock may not, as a practical matter, be possible. Thus Rule 144, in effect,
imposes a perpetual "taint" upon restricted stock; whether this taint is sufficient to consti-
tute a restriction that by its terms will never lapse seems open to question, in view of the
Rule's allowance for a sale at fair market value of an amount up to 1% of the issuing com-
pany's outstanding shares of that class-a percentage that is likely to be greater than the
percentage that a typical employee will receive upon exercise of a nonqualified stock option.
When, as in the hypothetical situation in text, the issuer is a nonreporting company, it may
prove virtually impossible to comply with the information-availability requirements of the
Rule, and the security holder with a large block of stock will thus be, for all practical purposes,
a prisoner of the Rule, although he may be free to effect a second-tier private placement at
the cost of a very substantial discount from the fair market value of his stock. For a similar
hypothetical problem see Helpern, The Unexpected Impact of New Section 83-The Re-
stricted Property Provisions, 24 TAx LAW. 365, 369-70 (1970).
145. This, of course, assumes that the taxpayer has income in an amount sufficient to
make the 50% rate applicable, and that the spread at exercise is earned income, which it
would be under the proposed regulations. See text accompanying notes 118-20 supra.
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tween the parties and that the lapsing or nonlapsing characteristics
of restrictions imposed by law are immaterial. This position is per-
haps supported by the fact that Congress, in enacting section 83,
omitted without comment a portion of the original Treasury pro-
posal that had provided for value adjustments for restrictions im-
posed by securities law and restrictions which by their terms will
never lapse.14 In view of the congressional power to define income,'47
and the singular inability of recent plaintiffs to succeed in argu-
ments constructed under the sixteenth amendment,"' the hypothet-
ical employee-plaintiff seems even more likely to lose on his second
point than on his first.
As a logical matter, the problems surrounding interpretation of
the "nonlapse" rules of subsections 83(a) and (b) appear virtually
unresolvable. Conceptually, if a restriction upon the use of property
is never to lapse, then it must bind the owner and his transferees or
successors forever. It is difficult to think why such a perpetual re-
striction would not violate the ancient rule against unreasonable
restraints on alienation. It seems certain that neither Congress nor
the Treasury contemplated such a result, although the proposed
regulations do require that the restriction "will continue to apply to,
and to be enforced against, any subsequent holder .. ."I" Per-
haps the most that can be said is that a final resolution of the
problems surrounding the concept of a restriction which by its terms
will never lapse will have to come from the courts. Although the
problems discussed above do not begin to exhaust the interpretative
difficulties that section 83 may raise, they do indicate that the
section is certain to make life considerably more difficult for em-
ployees who wish to defer taxation through the use of restricted
stock.
C. The Apparent Disutility of Stock-Option Compensation After
the Tax Reform Act of 1969
Even if a substantial number of the previously described ques-
tions that have arisen in the wake of the 1969 Act and the regula-
tions proposed thereunder are ultimately resolved in favor of tax-
payers, it seems clear that substantial questions remain about the
146. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 91st Cong., ist Sess., TAX REFORM PROPOSALS
CONTAINED IN THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF APRIL 21, 1969, H.R. Doc. No. 91-103
(Comm. Print 1969).
147. See Helpern, supra note 139, at 370.
148. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 3 (1968).
149. Proposed Treas. Reg. 1.83-5(a)(3), 36 Fed. Reg. 10792 (1971).
1286 [Vol. 26
STOCK OPTIONS
continued utility of stock option arrangements as employee incen-
tive devices. Prior to 1969, a highly compensated employee"" could,
through a qualified stock option plan, avoid the 70 percent maxi-
mum rate on compensation income and postpone taxation indefi-
nitely, with the promise of a 25 percent capital gain rate when he
ultimately decided to incur tax liability. After 1969, the employee
can use qualified stock options to accomplish precisely these same
objectives-deferral of taxation and transition to the capital gain
rate structure-but the incentives to do so are less and the newly
created potential costs are infinitely 5' greater. The employee's in-
centives are reduced because the tax rate that he is seeking to avoid
has dropped to 50 percent, while the rate that he seeks to gain has
risen to 35 percent. His potential costs, which did not exist before
the Tax Reform Act, now include a ten percent tax upon the exercise
spread that he had hoped to see taxed only in later years," 2 an
additional ten percent tax on one-half of his ultimate gain, and the
return to the 70 percent ordinary income bracket of an amount of
otherwise earned income equal to the spread at exercise. 5 3 To use a
numerical example, a pre-1969 taxpayer who received a share of
stock worth 200 dollars pursuant to the exercise of a qualified option
for a price of 100 dollars would pay no current tax; assuming that
he sold the stock when its value had increased by 50 percent four
years later,'54 he would take home 150 after-tax dollars of gain, as
compared to the 79 dollars he could have obtained by taking his
150. For purposes of this example, "highly compensated" means that the employee's
taxable income is eligible for the 70% bracket on ordinary income, that he has sufficient
current earned compensation income to suffer the full effect of any reduction in earned
taxable income resulting from excess tax preference items, and that the benefits of
§ 1201(b)'s 25% tax on the first $50,000 of capital gain have been applied elsewhere.
151. The potential costs are "infinitely" greater, not necessarily because costs may be
substantial, but because any cost at all is infinitely greater than zero. These potential costs
spring from the operation of the minimum tax on "excess" tax preference items imposed by
§ 56 and the disqualification of earned income by reason of "excess" tax preference mandated
by § 1348. For a taxpayer whose tax preference items have not recently exceeded $30,000,
however, these "costs" will not apply at all. They are therefore only potentially detrimental
to a taxpayer, depending upon the amount of tax preference items that he has. See notes 88-
89 supra and accompanying text; notes 102-04 supra and accompanying text.
152. Thus, the 10% minimum tax on the exercise spread in effect results in partial
impairment of the taxpayer's ability to defer current income, despite the provisions of § 421,
when the employee has tax preference items that exceed $30,000 plus current income tax.
153. This results from the operation of § 1348(b), which reduces earned taxable income
by the excess of current or averaged tax preference items over $30,000, thus ending the
eligibility of that amount of otherwise earned income for the 50% maximum rate and exposing
it to the ordinary income structure, which may call for a marginal rate as high as 70%. See
note 102 supra and accompanying text.
154. This assumes a growth rate in the value of the stock of 10% per annum.
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original 100-dollar spread as direct compensation income and in-
vesting, at ten percent, the after-tax proceeds, along with the 100
dollars he would have otherwise spent in exercising the option.'55
The post-1969 taxpayer in the same situation faces the possibility
of paying a ten-dollar minimum tax and an additional twenty dol-
lars of tax on his compensation income from section 1348 rate dis-
placement in the year of exercise; 5 ' and, after a 70-dollar capital
gains tax, a possible three-dollar minimum tax, and an additional
potential twenty-dollar tax payment from displacement of earned
income upon disposition of the stock eight years later, the taxpayer
might take home a gain of only 107 dollars. Had he simply taken
the amount of his stock option spread as cash compensation in the
original year, the 50 percent post-tax remnant, the 100 dollars that
otherwise would have supplied the option price, and the money
represented by the tax savings from avoiding the tax-preference
consequences of qualified option use, and applied the total sum to
a market purchase of the employer company's stock, the taxpayer
would have realized a net benefit of 128.50 dollars.'57 When the
possible adverse effects of the minimum and maximum taxes are
fully encountered, the passage of the 1969 Act would seem to have
155. If, in lieu of the stock-option arrangement, the highly compensated taxpayer had
received the $100 spread amount as additional salary, he would have paid $70 in tax on it,
and could have used the $30 remaining after taxes, with the $100 he would otherwise have
expended for the option exercise, to purchase stock in the employer corporation. When the
stock increased in value by 150% 4 years later, the taxpayer would pay a 25% tax on his capital
gain of $65, leaving him with a net economic gain of $79.
156. The additional $20 tax might result from the effects of § 1348 (b)'s reduction in
earned taxable income for excess preference items. If the highly compensated taxpayer has
$30,000 of other tax preference items, the $100 spread at exercise will reduce earned taxable
income for the current year by $100, thereby increasing the applicable tax rate on that $100
from 50% to 70%. Since a 50% tax rate applied to a $100 base results in $50 of tax, and a
70% rate results in $70 of tax, the application of § 1348 has cost the taxpayer $20 in tax that
he would otherwise not have had to pay.
157. Had the post-1969 highly paid taxpayer received an additional $100 in salary
rather than the $100 spread on his qualified option, he would have had to pay $50 in tax upon
the additional earned income, leaving him with $50 after taxes. Additionally, assuming that
§ 56's minimum tax on tax preference items would have had their full adverse effect if the
taxpayer had been compensated by means of a qualified stock option, the taxpayer will have
an additional $30 in tax savings from the use of current direct compensation. These sums,
together with the $100 no longer needed for option exercise, will in 4 years produce a capital
gain of $90, upon which the alternative tax will be $31.50. If the worst possible § 56 and
§ 1348 consequences operate upon the taxpayer's $45 tax preference in this later year, he will
incur a minimum tax of $1.35-10% x ($45 tax preference less $31.50 capital gain tax
paid)-and will have $45 of earned income transformed into ordinary income, at a tax cost
of $9.00. Thus the taxpayer's total after-tax capital gain is $48.15, which, together with his
original after-tax compensation and tax savings of $80 in the original year, will leave him with
a net gain of $128.50.
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destroyed the tax minimization advantages of qualified stock
options.
In the area of nonqualified options, the same sort of questions
about continued tax advantages may be raised. Prior to 1969, unre-
stricted nonstatutory options occupied an essentially neutral posi-
tion regarding taxpayer goals of tax deferral and minimization. By
paying a tax at ordinary income rates upon the spread at exercise
of his option, the highly compensated employee incurred exactly the
same tax liabilities-a 70 percent tax on the amount of compensa-
tion and a 25 percent tax on the ultimate capital gain-that he
would have incurred had he received the amount of the spread as
direct cash compensation and invested the after-tax remainder in
his employer's stock at current fair market value. After the Tax
Reform Act, however, this previously neutral device now involves a
possible tax penalty. If the proposed regulation's position-that the
exercise spread on nonqualified options whose terms permit exercise
more than three months after employment terminates will consti-
tute deferred compensation-' 58 is endorsed by the courts, the com-
pensation income realized upon exercise of such options will fail to
qualify for the 50 percent maximum rate of section 1348, and the
highly compensated taxpayer will therefore suffer an increased tax
of 20 dollars for every 100 dollars by which the market value of his
option stock exceeds the option price.
Ineligibility for the maximum rate on earned income may also
affect nonstatutory stock option arrangements that involve the use
of restrictions upon the optioned stock. In addition to the penalty
of ineligibility for the maximum rate on earned income, other tax
consequences occasioned by the 1969 Act have considerably more
far-reaching effect on restricted stock arrangements. Prior to the
Tax Reform Act, affluent executives were able to achieve deferral
of taxation on the exercise spread of nonqualified options and to
secure the advantages of capital gain treatment for post-exercise
appreciation in the option stock's value by participating in option
arrangements that called for restrictions substantially affecting the
value of the stock. After the 1969 enactment of section 83, tax defer-
ral is still possible, but it can be achieved only at a cost of incurring
a substantial risk of forfeiture, rather than by a restriction that
merely affects value. Similarly, capital gain treatment, at the in-
creased 35 percent rate, can still be obtained for post-exercise appre-
ciation only at the price of current compensation income treatment
158. Proposed Treas. Reg. 1.1348-3(b)(3)(iii)(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 23819 (1971).
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for the spread at exercise. '
Thus, prior to 1969, a highly compensated employee who paid
an option price of twenty dollars for stock with a fair market value
of 100 dollars and a book value of 50 dollars that was subject to a
mandatory book-value buy-out provision for a period of eight years
would have paid no current tax. Assuming that both the fair market
value of the stock and the net worth of the company had doubled
eight years later, the employee at that time would have paid 56
dollars in tax on the 80-dollar spread at exercise (computed without
reference to the restriction), and would have a potential capital gain
of 100 dollars, which would ultimately result in 25 dollars of tax at
pre-1969 rates. Thus, upon disposition of the stock, the employee
would take home 99 dollars of after-tax gain. In addition, the em-
ployee would have enjoyed a tax savings in the exercise year of 56
dollars, an amount that could have been invested in company stock
which could have been disposed of for 98 after-tax dollars eight years
later. When this advantage to the taxpayer from the opportunity of
tax deferral is counted in, his total after-tax gain on the transaction
would have amounted to 197 dollars. Under the terms of the 1969
Act, however, an employee in the same situation would, at best,'60
pay a 40-dollar tax at the time of exercise upon the difference be-
tween the option price and the fair market value of the stock (com-
puted without regard to the buy-back restriction, since it will lapse
by its terms in eight years), and will have a potential capital gain
of 100 dollars, promising an eventual tax of 35 dollars. If the penal-
ties of sections 56 and 1348 are applicable, there will be an addi-
tional tax of 21.50 dollars upon disposition of the stock, and the
post-1969 employee will thus have 83.50 dollars of after-tax gain,
apparently a much less advantageous situation than that which
confronted his pre-Reform Act counterpart.
Similarly, if the restriction in the example above is changed to
one requiring forfeiture of the stock upon termination of employ-
ment within eight years, a pre-1969 employee who exercised such an
option would pay no tax upon exercise, would pay a tax of 56 dollars
upon lapse of the restriction, and would take home 99 dollars of
after-tax post-disposition gain. The post-1969 employee also is able
159. See note 156 supra and accompanying text.
160. At best, the exercise would be considered earned income. Under the proposed
regulations, however, the exercise of a nonstatutory option whose terms permit exercise more
than 3 months after termination of employment will result in "deferred compensation" and
thus in ineligibility for the 50% rate on earned income. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1348-
3(b)(3)(iii)(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 23819 (1971).
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to defer taxation, since the restriction now imposes a substantial
risk of forfeiture, but upon the restriction's lapsing in the eighth
year he will have to take into his compensation income the entire
difference between the 200-dollar appreciated fair market value of
the stock and the twenty-dollar option price. This will entail a 90-
dollar tax payment under the 50 percent maximum rate on earned
income" ' and will leave the employee with an after-tax gain of 90
dollars if the stock is sold; a result again reflecting a less favorable
situation after 1969.
Finally, if the restriction is changed to a nonlapsable book-
value buy-out provision, which is cancelled under circumstances
suggesting compensation in the eighth year, the pre-1969 employee
would have paid no tax at exercise, would presumably have paid a
56-dollar ordinary income tax upon cancellation, and would have
had an ultimate after-tax gain of 99 dollars. The employee also
would have saved 21 dollars in the year of exercise by deferring
taxation on the 30-dollar economic value of his gain at that time, a
savings that could have grown to 36.75 after-tax dollars by the time
of cancellation, if invested at ten percent. The post-1969 employee,
however, would pay a fifteen dollar earned-income tax on the 30-
dollar difference between book value and option price (the restric-
tion is taken into account since by its terms it never lapses), and,
when the restriction is cancelled, a 50-dollar tax upon the 100-dollar
resulting increase in the stock's value.1 2 The 50 dollars of untaxed
appreciation presumably will receive capital gain treatment upon
disposition of the stock, resulting in a tax of 17.50 dollars, a possible
preference tax of 75 cents, and a possible increase in tax from dis-
placement of earned income of five dollars."' Thus the employee
would have a total after-tax gain of 92.25 dollars, a result apprecia-
bly less advantageous than under pre-1969 law, even when the value
of the tax saving occasioned by the pre-1969 employee's ability to
defer taxation completely is not considered."4
161. The 50% maximum rate offered by § 1348 would clearly apply here, since the
compensation is received less than one year following the year the substantial risk of forfeiture
terminated. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1348(b)(1).
162. The $50 tax assumes that the 50% maximum tax rate on earned income will apply.
See note 160 supra.
163. These effects from the minimum and maximum tax provisions will take place only
if the highly compensated employee has tax preference items in the year of disposition of over
$30,000 plus taxes paid.
164. The pre-1969 employee in this situation had $56 in the year of exercise that would
have gone to pay taxes had taxation not been deferred. If the employee had invested this
amount in company stock, its value would have been increased to $112 by the year of cancella-
tion, at which time he could have disposed of it and collected $98 in after-tax proceeds.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONTINUED UTILITY OF OPTION ARRANGEMENTS
UNDER THE 1969 ACT
A. Questions That Must Be Answered To Analyze the Ultimate
Impact of the 1969 Changes
As the preceding section demonstrates, it is easy to show that
the full adverse effects of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, when compared
to the results under prior law, can operate to limit severely the
utility of stock option arrangements as a means of attracting and
holding key employees. Extreme examples of comparative disutility
do not, however, support a conclusion that stock options are mori-
bund as executive compensation devices, although some commenta-
tors have apparently taken this stance."5 First, to say that stock
options are less desirable now than in 1968 is not to say that stock
options are presently undesirable. Secondly, the Reform Act provi-
sions' design to affect adversely high-income taxpayers who have
structured their transactions to receive substantial amounts of in-
come through congressionally disfavored sources does not automati-
cally mean that every taxpayer who dares to exercise a stock option
will suffer disastrous tax consequences. Finally, although the tax
consequences of compensation are undeniably important, nontax
considerations should not be ignored in analyzing the utility of com-
pensation arrangements.
It is impossible to evaluate accurately the impact of the 1969
changes on stock option arrangements without first identifying pre-
cisely the goals that option arrangements are designed to achieve,
for it is only to the extent that the Reform Act thwarts realization
of those goals that it diminishes the utility of option compensation,
regardless how horrific its consequences may seem in the abstract.
Clearly, the goals sought through option arrangements are shaped
with the desires of two separate parties in mind-employer corpora-
tions and employees. For purposes of analysis, perhaps it is more
helpful to examine the parties' goals separately before proceeding
to evaluate the chances of their attainment under the provisions of
the Tax Reform Act.
1. The Employer's Objectives. -There are at least four identi-
fiable goals that employer corporations may wish to attain through
the use of option arrangements. First, the employer corporation may
desire to imbue its employers with a sense of proprietary concern,
so that they will identify the corporate welfare as tantamount to
165. See, e.g., Childs, supra note 2, at 818.
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their own. Secondly, the employer may wish to place the employee
in a position such that he will receive a direct financial advantage
to the extent his own job efforts increase the profitability of the
company's operations. Thirdly, the corporation must couch its offer
of participation in terms attractive enough to secure and retain
desirable employees-a presumably scarce commodity, sought after
by many potential employers. Finally, the corporation will want to
achieve the preceding objectives at the least possible cost.
2. The Employee's Objectives. -While employees may have
genuine desires to become shareholders of the corporation, presuma-
bly they are concerned primarily with maximizing their own finan-
cial returns. Thus, the overriding employee goal in any compensa-
tion arrangement would seem to be the realization of maximum
after-tax economic benefit. Depending upon his total income situa-
tion, an employee obviously will be interested in deferring taxation,
securing a lower tax rate, or combining these techniques to maxim-
ize his economic gain from a given amount of compensation. Al-
though stock option arrangements, even after the 1969 Act, can be
used to achieve both deferral and rate reduction to some extent,
defining employee goals only in terms of the possible operation of
these tax planning techniques upon a given compensation
"amount" would result in incomplete analysis.
In addition to weighing the tax consequences attendant to the
various forms that his compensation might take, the employee must
be concerned about the absolute amount that he will receive before
taxes. Obviously the employee who succeeds in securing from his
employer the "perfect" tax minimization compensation arrange-
ment will do little to accomplish his underlying objective of maxi-
mum economic benefit if his pretax income is insubstantial; con-
versely, an employee who unthinkingly exposes his satisfactorily
high compensation to the most massive tax bite possible has also
failed to achieve his ultimate goal. Realization of that goal necessar-
ily entails receipt of an optimum package of pretax compensation
with some tax-limiting form.
An employee might maximize his economic gain through stock
options because of their pretax benefits as well as their tax inci-
dents, because an employer should logically be willing to place a
more substantial pretax gain in the employee's hands through stock
options than through alternative forms of compensation. This non-
tax advantage of option arrangements arises, first, because granting
a stock option costs the employer corporation very little in compari-
son to the benefit it affords the employee. In the absence of a spread
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at grant, there is no charge against corporate earnings, ' and the
employee still receives a valuable (and usually tax-free) right to
benefit from any appreciation in the stock's value without assuming
any investment risk. ' Secondly, the corporation would seem to
incur only minimal later costs. If the employee does not exercise his
option, the corporation cannot be said to have suffered any great
option-related economic detriment. Even when the employee real-
izes a significant economic gain through exercising an option on
appreciated stock, the spread at exercise is not a charge against
earnings for financial reporting purposes, 6' and any real cost in-
volved, such as the economic cost of foregoing the sale of stock at a
higher price or that of a dilution in earnings per share, is borne by
individual shareholders.' 9 Finally, since the employer may affirma-
tively desire that key employees acquire a proprietary stake in the
business, he may thus be willing to incur a greater cost in providing
employees with company stock than in supplying economic benefits
that carry no such intrinsic advantage to the corporation. In short,
the employer is likely to feel that he can spend less but get more by
using stock options.
B. Limits on the Degree to Which the 1969 Act Can Affect the
Achievement of Stock Option Objectives
1. No Impact on Nontax Objectives. -By definition, the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 could hardly have affected the nontax goals that
stock option arrangements are designed to achieve. It is still impor-
tant, however, to emphasize that the employer objectives of instill-
ing proprietary attitudes and providing incentives for profit-making
performance are left untouched by the Act. Similarly, there is no
impairment of the employee's ability to realize maximum pretax
166. See Anderson, Traditional Forms of Compensation (Options, Stock and Cash)
After the Tax Reform Act, 24 U. So. CAL. TAx INsT. 547, 550 (1972).
167. Cash compensation, on the other hand, entails a charge against corporate income,
in the amount of the compensation. Even though the corporation may, through its ability to
deduct the same amount from its taxable income, incur an actual cost of little more than
half the compensation paid out, it is a cost nonetheless. See Bachelder, Tax and Accounting
Aspects of Costs of Nonqualified Compensation Plans, N.Y.U. 30TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 443
(1972).
168. Anderson, supra note 166, at 550.
169. Although the corporation and its owners (shareholders) are separate legal entities,
and the shareholders' costs are not those of the corporation, it may seem sophistic to assert
that option exercise thereby costs the corporation nothing. It is possible, however, that share-
holders, at least in a publicly held corporation, will not suffer the full adverse economic effects
of dilution, since it may not, due to other factors that influence the market, be reflected in
the market price of their stock.
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economic gain through the employer's willingness to provide larger
absolute benefits in option form. The relative importance of these
nontax objectives of option compensation vis-a-vis tax-related goals
is difficult to assess, since each is in large part a product of the
employer's subjective judgment. Nevertheless, it seems possible
that some employers and employees might conclude that stock op-
tion arrangements have substantial continued utility, regardless of
the possibility of severely reduced tax advantages under the 1969
Act.
2. Narrow Scope of Impact on Tax Related Objectives.-Tax
considerations obviously bear heavily on the capability of employees
to achieve maximization of after-tax compensation, and, to a lesser
extent, upon the employer's objective of reducing compensation
costs.'70 Thus, to the extent that the 1969 Act substantially impairs
the ability of employers and employees to accomplish these goals
through the use of stock options, it has impaired the general utility
of stock option arrangements. None of the potentially adverse provi-
sions of the Reform Act, however, applies to all stock options. To
the extent that these provisions do not apply, the utility of stock
option arrangements will, again by definition, be as great as under
prior law.
Generally, the 1969 Act can be said to have little or no effect
on the ability of employers and employees to use qualified options
for achieving tax-minimization objectives unless the employee is
relatively highly compensated; the position of an employee whose
purchase or disposition of option stock does not remove him from
the category of persons with salaries less than 52,000 dollars and tax
preference items not exceeding 30,000 dollars is not changed by the
Tax Reform Act. Similarly, the tax treatment of nonqualified op-
tions that do not involve restrictions remains unaffected by the Act,
unless the employee has a sufficiently high amount of earned in-
come to make "deferred compensation" disqualification of such in-
come applicable.
(a) The Minimum Tax.-The minimum tax has no effect on
employer deductions or nonqualifying options; it may have virtually
no impact on qualified option use by middle-income employees and
highly paid executives who receive substantially all their income
170. The significance of tax law on employer cost reduction goals lies in the question
of whether the employer will receive a deduction as the result of the transaction. Since, with
respect to stock options, the Tax Reform Act has changed the law in this area only in the
context of restricted property, this consideration is considerably less critical than the question
of the employee's tax treatment.
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through salaries and options. The ten percent tax on items of tax
preference imposed by section 56 applies only when the taxpayer's
preference items for the current year exceed 30,000 dollars plus both
his current income tax liability and his tax carryovers from the
previous seven years. Thus, middle-income employees have little to
fear from the minimum tax; even an employee with a taxable in-
come of 100,000 dollars could absorb a 72,000-dollar spread on exer-
cise or a 144,120-dollar capital gain on disposition without incurring
the minimum tax if he has no other tax preferences for the current
year. If the employee had not received tax preference items exceed-
ing 30,000 dollars per year in the recent past, those amounts could
increase enormously.' Furthermore, since the income tax gener-
ated by each marginal dollar of salary can shield up to 50 cents
worth of tax preference items from the minimum tax, even a very
highly compensated executive need not worry about the minimum
tax, as long as his current compensation income remains at least
18,000 dollars above two-thirds of his total income." 2 In the event
the employee should suffer the catastrophe of having his tax prefer-
ence items exceed the generous offsets provided by the Code, he still
may not feel the brunt of the full ten percent tax. If the offending
preference item is capital gain from the disposition of his option
stock, the 35-percent alternative tax due will increase the allowed
offset, resulting in an effective rate of only three percent on the
preference amount.7 3 Only when the offending item is the exercise
spread on a qualified option, which itself generates no offsetting tax
liability,'74 will the full minimum tax impact be felt.
(b) The Maximum Tax. -The maximum tax has relevance only
for relatively highly compensated employees. Although the maxi-
mum 50-percent rate on earned income affects qualified stock op-
171. The increase comes from the carryover provisions of § 56(c); which allow "unused"
amounts of tax liability to be applied against preference items over the following 7 years. See
notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
172. The $18,000 figure represents the tax paid on the first $52,000 of the employee's
income, before the 50% rate becomes applicable. The example assumes that the 50% maxi-
mum rate on earned income applies. To the extent that the employee is taxed at the higher
rates of § 1, the sheltering ratio would be correspondingly greater.
173. For example, a $100 capital gain represents a "prima facie" preference item of $50.
The offsetting tax ($35) generated, however, reduces the preference item to $15, 10% of which
is $1.50. $1.50 is 3% of the original preference item.
174. Even the exercise spread can generate offsetting tax in one situation. When the
employee suffers from displacement of earned income as a result of the tax preference repre-
sented by an option spread in excess of $30,000, the transposition to the ordinary income rate
schedule can increase the employee's taxes by an amount equal to 20% of the spread, thus
doubly shielding the spread from the minimum tax.
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tion arrangements by reducing the disparity between the maximum
rates applicable to current salary and capital gains, this effect is not
felt unless the taxpayer has earned income in excess of 52,000 dol-
lars.'75 Similarly, section 1348's earned income disqualification pen-
alty for tax preferences will not become significant until the em-
ployer has taxable income over 52,000 dollars and current or aver-
aged tax preference items in excess of 30,000 dollars. Thus, a highly
compensated employee can absorb 130,000 dollars of exercise spread
or capital gain preference over the five-year period during which a
qualified option is allowed to remain outstanding without experi-
encing any adverse effect under section 1348.76 Finally, the maxi-
mum tax provisions cannot affect the exercise of nonqualified op-
tions unless the employee receives in excess of 52,000 dollars in
earned income. The maximum tax has no effect on employer deduc-
tions.
(c) Capital Gain Rate.-The Reform Act's increase in the
section 1201 alternative tax rate has no effect on employees whose
ordinary income plus capital gain not deductible under section
1202 is less than 52,000 dollars. 77 Even for high-income taxpayers,
the first 50,000 dollars of capital gain is taxed only at 25 percent.
Thus at least 50,000 dollars of post-1969 gain can be received each
year without experiencing the effects of the 1969 Act.
(d) Section 83.-Although section 83 does not apply to quali-
fied stock options, it reaches nonqualified option arrangements re-
gardless of the amount involved. The section changes pre-1969 law,
however, only when restrictions are imposed upon the option stock,
thus leaving nonrestricted, nonqualified option devices unaffected
by the Tax Reform Act.
C. Effects of the Reform Act Upon the Tax-Related Goals of High-
Income Taxpayers
As previously indicated,' 78 when the full adverse effects of its
provisions are felt, the Tax Reform Act can substantially diminish
the opportunity of maximizing after-tax gain through the use of
175. Since the ordinary income rates of § 1 do not exceed 50% until taxable income goes
above $52,000, the maximum tax has no effect prior to that point, and thus cannot be accused
of reducing the disparity. It should be noted here that the first $50,000 of capital gain is taxed
only at 25% by the alternate tax of § 1201(b).
176. This assumes that the taxpayer has no other tax preferences.
177. Taxpayers with smaller "total" incomes will obtain an effective tax rate of 25% or
less through the graduated rates of § 1.
178. See text accompanying notes 150-64 supra.
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option arrangements. The full adverse effects of the 1969 Act are
not, however, inexorably visited upon even the high-income em-
ployee. When the employee's economic status exposes him to the
possibility that the 1969 provisions will become operative, it is by
no means certain that all provisions will apply, or that the tax
consequences of the applicable provisions warrant an automatic
conclusion that stock options are no longer viable tax-saving de-
vices. To the extent that the provisions of the Act do apply, it can
be assumed that the results will be less favorable than under prior
law, and the question becomes whether option arrangements retain
tax utility as compared with existing compensation alternatives.
Since space does not permit individual consideration of the plethora
of currently possible compensation devices, the utility of stock op-
tion compensation will be compared with that of compensation in
cash for two reasons. First, the availability of the 50 percent maxi-
mum tax suggests that cash may now be a relatively desirable form
of compensation; hence, insofar as stock options can improve upon
the after-tax results produced by earned income, they certainly can
be said to have retained tax minimization utility. Secondly, cash
compensation represents a convenient standard against which to
measure relative utility; since other forms of compensation are
likely to be described utilizing comparison with traditional salary
arrangements, a similar analysis here may provide something of a
common denominator.
1. The Qualified Option, the Highly Compensated Executive,
and the 1969 Act. -Regardless of the heights to which an employee's
income may rise, the minimum tax provisions of section 56 and the
increased alternative capital gain rate of section 1201 are not likely
to impinge substantially upon his ability to achieve the tax minimi-
zation goals of qualified option arrangements. Although the fifteen
percentage point differential between the alternative capital gain
rate and the earned-income rate under the 1969 Act is much less
than the 45 point differential that existed under prior law, the capi-
tal gain rate is still lower, hence more advantageous. Superficially,
it might seem that the addition of a ten percent minimum tax on
the exercise spread and what amounts to a five percent minimum
tax on the capital gain at disposition7 ' would exactly cancel out any
advantage from the transition to the alternative rate structure of-
179. The minimum tax is 10% of the preference item (less offsets). Since the preference




fered by qualified options; this is by no means the case, however,
for three reasons. First, the alternative and "preference" capital
gain taxes are applied only after the employee has had the oppor-
tunity to defer taxation for as long as he wishes, thus gaining for
himself any pre-tax appreciation on the portion of the option spread
that was sheltered from direct taxation at exercise.8 " Thus, even
assuming that the full adverse effects of the minimum tax apply,
the employee whose option stock doubles in value between exercise
and disposition will enjoy an ultimate after-tax gain that is 135
percent greater than the gain he would have achieved by taking an
amount equal to the spread at exercise as direct cash compensation
and investing the sum remaining after taxes in the employer's
stock. " The substantiality of this tax advantage, however, is clearly
dependent upon continued growth in the market value of the em-
ployer corporation's stock. Secondly, even when the value of the
employer's stock remains constant, the total of the ten percent pref-
erence tax at exercise and the five percent rate applicable at disposi-
tion will not totally eradicate the fifteen point rate differential be-
tween the capital gain and earned-income taxes, because the tax
generated by the capital gain itself will reduce the effective rate at
disposition.' Finally, it seems quite likely that the tax penalties
from preference items will not affect most employees, since the
higher the employee's current compensation, the more likely it is
that the offsetting tax thereby generated will completely shelter his
180. There is something of a semantic problem in analyzing the tax effects of the
preference taxes. Thus, the minimum tax is "on" the amount represented by the preference
item, but the maximum tax displacement penalty is not really a tax "on" anything; it's
simply a disqualification of an amount of "earned income" for the earned income rate. For
purposes of a more descriptive analysis, both the minimum tax and the maximum tax penal-
ties will be treated as separate "costs."
181, This example, of course, involves assuming either that the maximum tax does not
apply, or that the taxpayer has no earned income available to suffer from displacement. The
example also involves assuming that the capital gain realized upon disposition would some-
how not generate offsetting tax. It does, however, show the benefits of deferral. On exercise,
the option-compensated employee would have a $10 tax cost, and on disposition, would pay
a $10 tax, in addition to his $70 capital gains tax, for an after-tax gain of $120. The cash-
compensated employee would have $50 after taxes, plus $10 saved from not paying a prefer-
ence tax. Invested in company stock, this $60 will grow to $120, which, after taxes of $21 for
capital gains, and $6 for preference, will leave a net gain of $93, of which $120 is approxi-
mately 129%.
182. The offset amounts to the tax paid on the tax preference item. Since the preference
item is equal to 50% of the entire capital gain, and since the tax amounts to 35% of the gain,
only 15% of the total gain is left as a preference item. Thus, the preference tax rate of high-
bracket capital gains is 1.5% of the entire gain, or 3% of the pre-offset preference item, and




preference items from the minimum tax.'"3 Moreover, in the unlikely
event that his option prospects are so overwhelmingly lucrative that
they threaten exhaustion of available tax offsets, the employee can
arrange for option terms allowing installment exercise, in order to
ensure that tax carryover from up to seven years prior to grant can
be brought into play. In view of the ease with which preference items
may be sheltered, it seems safe to conclude that the minimum tax
may be largely disregarded for the purpose of subsequent analysis.
Post-1969 survival of the qualified option's potential for tax
minimization under sections 56 and 1201, however, does not mean
that the erstwhile optionee is home free. The antipreference reach
of section 1348 is broad enough to impair severely the tax utility of
option arrangements for high-income taxpayers. Like the other pro-
visions of the Reform Act, however, section 1348 does not impose a
blanket penalty on qualified option use. As previously noted, '84 sec-
tion 1348 does not affect employees who earn less than 52,000 dollars
a year; conversely, it will not reach employees whose preference
items remain below 30,000 dollars a year, regardless of how much
they earn. For employees who do not fit within either of the above
situations, the displacement-of-earned-income penalties of section
1348 are incurred only gradually, as the employee moves from 52,000
to 200,000 dollars of otherwise earned taxable income per year.'5
More importantly, even the full adverse effects of the maximum
rate provisions may not wipe out entirely the ability of employees
to maximize after-tax gain through qualified option arrangements,
because of the opportunity for appreciation in the option stock's
value prior to taxation that such arrangements afford.
It is possible to view section 1348's maximum rate-
displacement effects as imposing an additional twenty percent tax
on the spread at exercise of a qualified option and an additional ten
percent tax on the appreciated spread at disposition of the underly-
ing stock,'86 thus resulting in an effective tax rate of 65 percent, as
183. See notes 171-72 supra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 175-76 supra and accompanying text.
185. This means the employee is moving from the 53% bracket, in which displacement
of $100 of earned income will result in only a $3 increase in tax, to the 70% bracket, where
displacement of the same amount results in a $20 increase.
186. In analyzing the effects of § 1348 earned income displacement on qualified op-
tions, it is important to distinguish between capital gain generated by appreciation on the
option spread, and capital gain generated by the amount actually invested, i.e. the option
price. The former is the distinguishing attribute of qualified option treatment; the latter




compared to the 50 percent rate that would have applied had the
employee taken the same amount of compensation in cash. Under
this kind of analysis, qualified options would lose all tax advantage
once the section 1348 vulnerable employee passed the 60 percent
marginal rate on ordinary income. Compensation in the form of a
100-dollar option spread to an employee in the 60 percent bracket
would result in a ten-dollar tax increase from displacement of
earned income on exercise, and upon disposition a 35-dollar capital
gain tax, coupled with an additional five-dollar tax increase from
the displacement effects of section 1348. The tax effect of straight
cash compensation in the same amount would be an immediate tax
of 50 dollars. Since the total tax would be equal to 50 dollars in each
case, and since any increase in the employee's marginal tax rate
would result in additional penalty effect under the option arrange-
ment but would not alter the tax effect of the cash compensation
scheme, the qualified stock option invariably would be declared
disadvantageous for employees whose taxable incomes exceed
100,000 dollars. 87
Although the above analysis is based upon the undeniably cor-
rect premise that the total tax burden upon a given amount of
qualified option compensation begins to exceed the total tax burden
on cash compensation after applicability of the 60 percent ordinary
income rate, the analysis itself is unsound, because it does not allow
for the effects of stock appreciation and tax deferral. It is not suffi-
cient merely to sum up the tax rates that are effectively applied to
the stock option spread. This will distort the actual impact of the
individual rates because they are applied at different times between
which the amount to which they apply can appreciate in value. For
example, even in the most unfavorable section 1348 situation, the
exercise of a qualified stock option will entail a current tax penalty
equal only to twenty percent of the spread, while the receipt of an
equal amount of current cash compensation will result in the imme-
diate imposition of a 50 percent tax. Assuming the amount in ques-
tion is 100 dollars, the employee who exercised his option has paid
the government twenty dollars, thereby foregoing any future pro-
ductive use of that money; but he has retained, in the form of stock,
the entire 100-dollar gain from the exercise spread, and may look
forward to an intervening period during which that amount may
187. That is, those employees whose marginal rates exceed 60%, and for whom (under




grow, before it becomes subject to taxation at an effective rate of
45 percent.' s' On the other hand, although a similarly situated em-
ployee who received cash would have only 50 dollars left from his
100-dollar paycheck, he would have twenty more after-tax dollars
than his option-compensated counterpart, because he would not
have had to suffer a 20 percent penalty from sacrificing 100 dollars
of earned income to the ordinary rate structure. The employee
would therefore have 70 after-tax dollars as a result of choosing cash
in lieu of option compensation, and would, as a rational high-
income individual, presumably invest the amount in productive
assets. For the purpose of eliminating analytical complications,'89 it
may be assumed that these assets will appreciate in value at the
same rate as the company stock. With the tax effects of the initial
compensatory transactions accounted for, the situation now pres-
ents an adequate framework for analysis of the effects of deferral
and appreciation. The cash recipient can, like the option holder,
expect an intervening period of asset growth before the gain on his
70-dollar investment will be taxed at the same 45 percent effective
rate that will apply to his counterpart's gain, since both employees
are equally affluent, hence vulnerable to displacement of earned
income by capital gain. The difference between the two is that the
option-compensated employee has 100 dollars worth of assets,
which, together with additional gains from growth, will be taxed in
the future at 45 percent, while the cash-compensated employee has
70 dollars in assets, only the subsequent gain from which will be
exposed to the 45 percent tax. In any future year, the first em-
ployee's ultimate economic gain will therefore be equal to 55 percent
of the amount to which his 100 dollar spread has grown, while that
of the second employee will be 70 dollars plus his after-tax gain-55
percent of the amount by which the appreciated value of his invest-
ment exceeds 70 dollars. Thus, if the value of the option spread has
grown to an amount X, the value of the cash investment, since both
grow at the same rate, will have grown to .7X, and the ultimate
economic benefit to be derived will be .55X'9 ° for the first employee,
188. This 45% figure is comprised of the 35% capital gains rate and the effective 10%.
penalty from an amount of earned income equal to the preference element of the appreciated
spread, and since the tax increase from displacement is 20% of that amount, the amount of
displacement penalty is equal to 20% of 50%, or 10% of the appreciated spread.
189. Although different investments in reality will likely grow at different rates, no one
can tell beforehand what the rate will be. Since this analysis is confined to tax effects, the
intrusion of elements of "betting on the market" would not be helpful or analytically sound.
190. The effective tax rate on disposition is 45%, see note 188 supra, and the tax due
on disposition is thus .45X, and the after-tax gain, by subtraction, is .55X.
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and $70.00 + .55(.7X-$70.00), or $31.50 + .385X, for the second.
Clearly, as the employer's stock increases in value, the amount of
the difference between .55X and .385X will grow larger and larger.
Just as clearly, once the amount of that difference exceeds $31.50,
the employee who utilized the stock option arrangement will have
the larger ultimate economic gain. That difference (.165X) here
equals $31.50 when the value of the original option spread has grown
to $190.91, thus promising the option-compensated employee that
he will maximize his after-tax economic gain by holding on to his
optioned stock until its value rises to approximately 191 percent of
the market price at exercise.
Similarly, since the dollar figures in the above example may be
directly transposed to generally applicable percentages, any em-
ployee can be certain that qualified option arrangements will offer
greater tax advantages than cash compensation whenever the op-
tion stock has a substantial growth potential. Assuming that a ten
percent annual growth rate is likely to be typical, the "magic" 191.1
percent appreciation figure is reached in around seven years;91 since
qualified arrangements retain tax utility even in the absence of
deferral and appreciation considerations for taxpayers below the 60
percent bracket, those taxpayers for whom the 191.1 percent figure
is relevant would seem well able to afford the wait. For taxpayers
above the 60 percent tax bracket who find it necessary to dispose of
optioned stock before it has approximately doubled in value, how-
ever, there seems to be no escape from the penalizing effects of
section 1348. The absence of any tax-generated preference-item off-
set and the presence of the five year averaging provision leave the
taxpayer no apparent means of circumventing the 30,000-dollar
limit on penalty-free qualified option exercise or capital gain re-
ceipt. Except as to these taxpayers, the previously described insub-
stantiality of the threat posed by the minimum tax provision and
the preceding analysis would seem to warrant the conclusion that
qualified stock option arrangements, even after the 1969 Act, re-
main capable of advancing the tax-related objectives of employees.
2. The Nonqualified Option and the 1969 Act.-The Tax Re-
form Act changes impinge upon unrestricted nonqualified option
arrangements since the capital gain rate, upon eventual disposition
of the optioned stock, is increased and the capital gain itself may
generate tax-preference and earned-income displacement penalties.
These adverse tax consequences are, in the absence of appreciation
191. At the end of 7 years, the percentage figure would be 194.87%.
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in the optioned stock's value, effectively compensated for by the
twenty percent decrease in the tax burden on exercise as a result of
the maximum rate on earned income.'9 2 Any post-exercise apprecia-
tion, however, by increasing the amount of after-tax gain repre-
sented by the disparity between the 25 percent alternative rate
under prior law and the 45 percent effective rate on disposition that
is now likely to be encountered by high income taxpayers on disposi-
tion, will render nonqualified options less advantageous after 1969
than before. Nevertheless, given the availability of earned income
treatment for the spread at exercise, nonstatutory options are
equally as effective as cash in achieving tax minimization goals, and
should not, therefore, be ruled out as compensation devices.
Similarly, the adverse consequences attending the realization
of capital gains under the 1969 Act operate to reduce the tax advan-
tages of nonqualified option arrangements involving restricted
stock. The additional tax effects resulting from section 83's applica-
tion to these arrangements, however, make analysis somewhat more
difficult. Although section 83 allows employees to defer taxation,
the section 83 deferral opportunity is not as attractive as the deferral
opportunity presented under prior law for two reasons. First, section
83 deferral is conditioned upon the imposition of a substantial risk
of forfeiture. While it seems clear, for example, that incurring a
twenty percent probability of losing one's stock is economically
equivalent to suffering a twenty percent tax on that stock's value,
degrees of risk are probably not susceptible to such a percentage
definition. The impact of the forfeiture requirement of section 83 is
therefore not quantifiable, and will depend upon the subjective
judgment of the individual employee. Secondly, section 83 requires
that any deferral-period appreciation in the optioned stock's value
be taxed as compensation, rather than as capital gain. As compared
to pre-1969 law, this requirement actually decreases the tax rate
that is applied at the time of restriction lapse from 70 percent to 50
percent'93 (assuming the stock is not sold at lapse), but it potentially
increases the amount subject to taxation by the amount of post-
192. The 1969 Act's reduction of the rate on exercise (assuming the exercise qualifies
for earned income treatment) is equal to 20% of the spread. Assuming the stock does not
appreciate, the same amount will be taxed at the increased post-1969 rates on disposition.
The effective rate on disposition is 45% (assuming that the disposition is completely sheltered
from the minimum tax), a 20% increase over the pre-1969 25% capital gain rate, and the 2
changes cancel each other out.
193. There is no problem here with the availability of earned income treatment for the
spread, since § 1348 specifically excludes amounts received upon the lapse of substantial
risks of forfeiture. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348(b)(1).
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exercise appreciation. Depending on the growth of the underlying
stock, an employee who sells his stock upon lapse of the restriction
could actually benefit more under section 83 than under prior law.
Since the pre-1969 employee's advantage from the 25 percentage
point rate differential on appreciation will not offset the section 83
employee's twenty point advantage on initial spread until the value
of the underlying stock increases to 180 percent of its value at the
date of exercise, section 83 would seem to present possibilities of tax
advantage to the recipient of restricted stock whose risk of forfeiture
terminates before the 180 percent appreciation point is reached.
This analysis, however, does not account for the economic detriment
from incurring a substantial forfeiture risk, nor does it account for
the fact that a pre-1969 taxpayer could put off taxation on post-
exercise appreciation until he decided to sell the stock, rather than
having the rate applied at the time of restriction lapse, so that he
could maximize his gain by holding the stock well beyond the 180
percent point.
Although the foregoing analysis would seem to indicate that the
use of restricted stock in nonstatutory option arrangements would
be substantially less advantageous after the Tax Reform Act than
before, such arrangements nevertheless provide tax advantages over
current cash compensation and may therefore have continued util-
ity as tax minimization devices. This continued utility derives from
the probability of appreciation and the tax benefits of deferral. For
example, if one employee receives 100 dollars of spread by exercising
a nonstatutory option on restricted stock, and a second employee
receives the same amount in direct cash compensation and then
invests the after-tax remainder in assets that will grow at the same
rate as the restricted stock, the first employee is in a more favorable
position to maximize after-tax gain. If the growth rate is zero, both
employees will have 50 dollars of net economic gain. For each one-
percent increase of growth above zero, however, the first employee
will have 50 cents of potential after-tax gain, while the second, even
assuming that none of the preference-related penalties apply, will
have a potential post-tax gain of only 32.5 cents.'94 In the first case,
the employee is receiving the benefit of all his productive resources;
194. For the first employee, each 1% increase in his $100 investment will represent a
potential $1 gain, which will be taxed at the 50% maximum rate, see note 118 supra and
accompanying text, leaving him 50¢ of after-tax gain. Each 1% increase in the second em-
ployee's $50 investment will bring him 500, which represents a potential gain that will be
taxed at the 35% rate for capital gains, resulting in a tax of 07.5o, and 32.5¢ of after-tax gain.
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in the second, the employee has donated one-half of his gain-
generating ability to the government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 has not ended the utility of stock
option arrangements as a means of achieving the goals that stock
options were presumably designed to secure. Most of those goals are
not incompatible with the congressional purpose of discouraging
attempts at tax avoidance through disfavored "preference" ave-
nues; yet to the extent that the employee's goal of maximizing eco-
nomic gain through minimizing taxation appears to conflict with
the legislative aim, substantial questions arise. Nevertheless, the
greater number of these questions disappear upon analysis, because
(1) the adverse effects of the applicable new Code sections have
relevance only to relatively highly paid employees, and (2) most
highly compensated employees, despite the fullest application of
the antipreference penalties the Code can muster, will still find that
stock option arrangements continue to provide tax advantages, al-
though those advantages are likely to be smaller than under prior
law. Only employees with taxable incomes over 100,000 dollars seem
inextricably hampered by the Act, and then only with reference to
qualified options, and only to the extent that their items of tax
preference exceed 30,000 dollars.
To say that stock option arrangements retain tax advantages,
of course, is not to say that stock options represent the most efficient
means available for tax minimization. Just as option compensation
generally is more effective than cash in advancing employee tax
objectives, other forms of compensation may be superior to options
as tax minimization devices. The point, however, is that when the
completely unimpaired nontax attributes of option compensation
are considered, the conclusion seems inescapable that stock options
have continued usefulness as tax-planning devices for the foresee-
able future.
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